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THE REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT AND CORPORATE
LAW REFORM IN MISSISSIPPI:
PART ONE
Wendell H. Holmes*
In 1987, the Mississippi Business Corporation Act1 (herein
after MBCA) will mark the first quarter-century of its exis
tence.1 The age of twenty-five years m ight seem mere infancy for
a major business statute, particularly one that comprehensively
supplanted the disconnected corporate statutes that p receded it.
Moreover, most corporate practitioners in this state would prob
ably agree that in commonplace transactions the MBCA
presents a workable set of rules with which to deal. Thus, one
might initially question the necessity (not to say the wisdom) of
the notion of corporate law reform which the title of this article
advances.
In a sense, however, the MBCA may be considered to be at
least thirty-six years old as of the writing of this article. The
MBCA was b ased upon the Model Business Corporation Act,
which in 1950 assumed the basic form with which the Missis
sippi Legislature worked. s In turn, the Model Act itself was

• Associate Professor of Law, University of Mississippi. B.A. 1974, Millsaps College;
J .D. 1977, Tulane University. The author acknowledges with gratitude the support of the

Lamar Order of the Law Alumni Chapter of the University of Mississippi, which pro
vided a Summer Research F ellowship which made possible the research for this article.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1
1

Miss. Coos ANN. §§ 79-3-3 to -293 (Supp. 1985).
For a discuss ion of the history of the adoption of the MBCA see Hodge & Perry,

The Model Business Corporation Act: Does the Mississippi Version Lime the Bushes?,

46 Miss. L.J. 371 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hodge & Perry]

• Eisenberg,
The Model Business Corporation Act and the Model Business
Corporaction Act Annotated, 29 Bus. LAW. 1407, 1407-08 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Eisenberg, Model Act]. Professor Melvin Eisenberg has noted that the first preliminary

draft of the Model Act appeared in 1943; in 1946, the Corporation Law Committee of the
American Bar Association promulgated the "Model for State Business Corporation
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largely adapted from the Illinois Business Corporation Act of
1933.' In some ways, then, the MBCA may have been dated

from its very inception.
Since its adoption, however, developments

in corporate

thinking have rendered the MBCA out moded in many signifi
cant respects. In the areas of formation, 11 corporate management
and governance,8 capitalization and distribution policy, organic
changes,

and

problems of the

close corporation,7

dra matic

changes in both statutory and case law have occurred. The sig
nificance of those developments alone would suggest the need
for a re-exa m ination of the MBCA.
The most significant signpost to a re-evaluation of our stat
ute is, however, the promulgation o f the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act (hereinafter RMA) in 1984. The RMA repre
sents the culmination of some five years of work by the Commit
tee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law of the American Bar Association. It is the first
complete revision of the Model Act for more than thirty years.9

Acts"; other revisions followed in 1950, 1953, 1959, and 1969. Id. It is noteworthy that by
1969, seven years after the adoption of the MBCA, a new edition of the Model Act had
been published which substantially differed from the MBCA in several important re
spects. See generally MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. (2d ed. 1971). Furthermore, sub
stantive revisions continued throughout the next decade, with major c h a nges occurring
in 1975, 1976, 1977, 1979, and 1980. 1 MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. ACT ANN. xxvi-xxix (3d ed.
1985). This process of revision, coupled with the need for either a new edition or recodifi
cation, led ultimately to the adoption of the 1984 Revised Model Business Corporation

Act. See infra n ote 8 and accompanying text. For further backgro u n d of the history of
the Model Act see Campbell, The Model Business Corporation Act, 1 1 Bus. LAW. 98
(1956); Garrett, History, Purpose and Summary o f the Model Business Corporation Act,
6 Bus. LAW. 1 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Garrett).
• 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr
ANN. § 1 (2d ed. 1971). It should be noted that in
1983, Illinois a dopted a completely revised business corporation act. Illinois Busin ess
Corporation Act of 1983, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 1.01-17.05 (Supp. 1983), rep ealing ILL.
R�v. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 1 57.1-167 (1933). For analyses of the new Illinois legislation see Van

Vhet, Jr., The New Illinois Business Corporation Act Needs More Work, 61 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1 (1985); Symposium on the 1983 Illinois Business Corporation Act, 1985 U. ILL.

L. REV. 635.
1
•

See infra notes 17 ·66 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 67-318 and accomp anying text.

' These latter topics will be the subject of Part
Two of this article.
• REVISED MODEL Bus1NESs CORP. AcT
ANN. xxiv-xxvi (3d ed. 1985). Sever al rea s on s
�derlie the ado�tion of the RMA rather than another revision to the 1969 Model Act.
First, the Committee on Corporate Laws
was considering updating the Model Business
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Since the source of Mississippi's general corporate law has now
been completely revamped and modernized, the implications of
the RMA for the future of Mississippi's corporate law should
surely be explored.
Finally, the history of the MBCA since its adoption demon
strates the need for critical re-analysis. Since 1962, only a hand
ful of amendments have occurred, almost all of them technical
in nature. 9 Thus, substantive innovations in corporate law since

Corporation Act Annotated to incorporate changes made since the 1971 edition and its
1973 and 1977 supplements. A third supplement, however, was deemed less practicab le
than a new edition. Id. at xxv. Concurrently, a 1979 study of portions of the Model Act
which had not been substantially revised since 1950 suggested numerous areas where the
experience of various states indicated that significant simplifications and innovations
could be made. Id. Among these would be a complete reorganization and renumbering of
the Model Act. Id. Finally, the process of substantive amendments which had transpired
since 1950 had resulted in a document internally inconsistent in format and drafting
style. Id. Coupled with the need to incorporate post-1977 amendments and the Commit
tee's determination to make further substantive amendments to the Model Act during
the drafting process, the decision was made to develop the RMA. Id.
An exposure draft of the RMA was circulated for comment in 1983. As will be fur
ther discussed herein, the draft differs in many significant respects from the final prod
uct. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS C ORP. ACT (Exposure Draft March 1983). After the
receipt of extensive commentary and a re-analysis and substantial revision of the draft,
the final draft was p ublished in 1984. 1 REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. ACT ANN. xxxii
:r.xxiii (3d ed. 1985). For further background o n the RMA see Goldstein, Revision of the
Model Business Corporation Act, 63 Tux. L. REV. 1471 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Gold
stein]; Goldstein & Hamilton, The Revised Model Business Corporatio n Act, 38 Bus.
LAW. 1019 (1983); Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1455 (1985) (here
inafter cited as Hamilton, Reflections].
•

The following sections of the Act have been amended: §§ 79-3-15 (reservation of

name increased to 180 days); 79-3-25 (increasing fee for service of process on Secretary of
State); 79-3-37 (decreasing vote necessary to approve stock options to insiders and not to
shareholders g e nerally); 79-3-43 (dealing with facsimile signatures); 79-3-55 (60 days no
tice of shareholders' meeting); 79-3-57 (closing of transfer books and record date in
creased to 60 days before meeting); 79-3-67 (directors must be 18); 79-3-103 (single in
corporator for professional corporation); 79-3-107 (eliminated publication requirement
for certificate o f incorporation); 79-3-119 (exempted regulated utilities); 79-3-123 (elimi
nated publicatio n requirement fo r articles of amendment); 79-3-141 (allows conversion of
shares of merging corporations into shares of corporation other than survivor); 79-3-142
(merger of domestic corporations and business trusts); 79-3-147 (eliminated publication
requirement for articles of merger or consolidation); 79-3-149 (eliminated p ublication re
quirement for merger of subsidiary corporation); 79-3-159 (broadened dissenters' rights
to include business combination as defined in 79-25-3(e)); 79-3-163 (eliminated publica
tion requirement for articles of dissolution); 79-3-189 (various amendments involving ad
ministrative suspension and dissolution); 79-3-209 (various amendments dealing with
survival of remedies); 79-3-249 (technical amendments dealing with annual reports); 79-
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1962 have gone largely ignored. Moreover, a cursory � la? c� a�
the Mississippi Digest and the Annotations to the M1ss1ss1pp1
Code of 1972 illustrate dramatically the paucity of judicial inter
pretation of the MBCA. As a result, significant ambi� uities i�
.
the Model Act which have been identified and extensively liti
gated in other jurisdictions still plague Mississippi practitioners,
who have no authoritative precedent to guide them.10 Moreover,
Mississippi has little precedent on many common-law corporate
issues which have in recent years been increasingly dealt with by
statute.11 Finally, the only article critically analyzing the MBCA
previously published in this Journal was of limited scope and is
now more than ten years old.12 The purpose of this article, then,

word
3-251 (technical amendments involving filing of annual reports); 79-3-253 (minor
ngin g
(cha
ing change regarding fee collection); 79-3-255 (changing filing fees); 79-3-257
79-3report);
miscellaneous charges); 79-3-259 (deleted penalty for failure to file annual
269 (changed disposition of fees, charges and penalties).
10 See, e.g., infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text. Of course, an im portant goal
of the drafters of the RMA was to respond to and clarify those ambiguities.

See, e.g., infra notes 99-173 and accompanying text. In addition, that auth ority
which does exist is, in some instances, confusing and outdated. The notorio u s ex ampl e is
11

Knox Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood, 228 Miss. 6 99, 89 So. 2d 799 (1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 97 (1957), the leading Mississippi opinion on director conflicts of interest. See
Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 386-90 (strict interpretation of opinion does not coin
cide with commercial practices or practicalities); Comment, Transactions Between
Corporation and its Directors: Where Does Mississippi Stand?, 52

a

Miss. L.J. 877, 889-95

(1982)(decision leaves many questions unanswered) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Transactions] . Knox Glass and general questions of director conflicts of interest are dis
cussed more fully at infra notes 141-73 and accompanying text.
12
See supra note 2. The authors of that article eschewed any effort at a comprehen·
sive re-appraisal, focusing instead on four subjects: provisions designed to protect credi
tors; P ovisions designed for the protection of shareholders; provisions designed for the
�
regulat on of transactions with officers and directors; and provisions dealing with the
�
protection of officers and directors. Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 373-75.
As of the writing of this article, the only other published article dealing primarily
.
with
the MBCA is McLendon, Formation, Operation and Dissolution of Busi ness Cor·
.
porations
, 39 Miss. L.J. 281 (1963), a summary of provisions of the then newly-adop ted
MBCA Other works dealing with the MBCA in some
context include Dunn -Cooper, A n
._
A lysis
;
of Mississippi's Treatment of Foreign Corporat
ions, 55 Miss. L.J. 259 (1985)
0 Neal, Preventative Law: Tailoring the Corporate Form of Business to Ensure Fair
Treatment of All, 49 Miss. L.J. 529 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as O'Neal Prevent ative
La w] ! om ent, Appreciated Property
as a Source of Dividends: Its Use
Effects in
�
.
Mismsip� i, 48 Miss. L.J. 309 (1977); Comment,
Valuation of Shares in a Closely-He ld
Corporation, 47 Miss. L.J. 715 (1976);
Comment, Oppression of Minority Shareho lders:
Proposed Mod� ! ? n suggested Remedies
, 4 7 Miss. L.J. 476 (1976). Other works deal.
.
.
g with pnor
M1ssiss1pp1 corporate laws include Roberds, The
New Corpora tion Act, 2

�

�

�

�nd

�
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is to examine selected portions of the RMA with a view towards
suggested revisions to the Mississippi Act. One point should be
made at the outset: this article does not advocate the wholesale
adoption of the RMA in Mississippi. Specific reasons for this
will be discussed in the context of the provisions of the RMA,
but some philosophical rationales can be noted here. By admis
sion of its authors, the RMA is meant to synthesize the recent
experience

of

corporate

drafters in "important

commercial

states."13 It may be fairly characterized as perpetuating the
trend towards "permissiveness" that has been the dominant
theme in corporate legislation following the adoption of the 1950
Model Act.1• I would not presume to resolve conclusively the ac-

Miss. L.J. 179 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Roberds]; Comment, The Power of an Equity
Court in Mississippi to Dissolue a Corporation, 15 Miss. L.J. 150 (1943).
11

1 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. AcT ANN. xxiv (3d ed. 1985).

" See, e.g., Branson, Countertrends in Corporate Law: Model Business Corporation
Act Reu ision, British Company Law Reform, and Principles of Corporate Gouernance
and Structure, 68 MINN. L. REV. 53, 62 (1983)(arguing that in large part due to the
Model Act, the enabling philosophy of corporate law has become dominant and the pro
tection of shareholders abandoned as a major goal of corporation act drafters) [hereinaf
ter cited as Branson, Countertrends]. Professor William Cary has noted that the original
Model Act was intended to serve as an alternative to the "permissive" Delaware ap
proach, which the Model Act drafters believed to afford insufficient protection to inves
tors. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Refiections on Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
665 (1974)[hereinafter cited as Cary, Federalism]. Cary believed that the process of
amendment to the Model Act over the years represented a conscious effort to "out-Dela
ware Delaware." Id.; cf. Garrett, supra note 3, at 7 (stating that the 1950 Model Act may
not appeal to states soliciting corporate business). Professor Eisenberg has noted that
the committee responsible for the Model Act was composed overwhelmingly of manage
ment lawyers, and that management-oriented changes to the Act took place for many
years with little or no comment from its drafters, e.g., the change from mandatory to
permissive cumulative voting in 1955. Eisenberg, Model Act, supra note 3, at 1410, 141415.

In general, criticism of the trend towards permissive, or management-oriented stat
utes, as opposed to regulatory, or investor-protective statutes, has been thematic in re
cent corporate scholarship. See, e.g., Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078,
1081 (1968)(practice of protecting corporate executives against litigation and liability has
been carried as far as it should be and perhaps further) [hereinafter cited as Bishop,
Sitting Ducks]; Branson, Countertrends, supra note 14, at 53-62 (corporate law no
longer has protection of shareholders at heart); Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory Responses
to Interested D irector Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 No
TRE DAME L. REV. 201, 220-22 (1977)(statutory changes may work to disadvantage of
minority shareholders) [hereinafter cited as Bulbulia & Pinto]; Cary, Federalism, supra,
at 665-66 (shareholders rights watered down to thin gruel); Eisenberg, Model Act, supra
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ademic debate as to the desirability of permissive rather than
regulatory statutes; at a minimum the RMA displays a large cor
poration orientation which in some instances would be clearly
inappropriate, or at least unnecessary, in Mississippi, where the
vast m ajority of domestically chartered corporations are closely
held.15

�

Thus, the methodology of this article is to compare t e
treatment of selected issues under the RMA a n d the MBCA m
effort to identify those areas of Mississip pi's law in need of
revision. This process, however, does not inevitably lead to the

an

conclusion that the. RMA should be adopted. Rather, the pur
pose of this article is to suggest the most desirable approach to
specific issues, whether the approach is that taken by the RMA,
the current MBCA, or the statutes of other states.
The potential scope of such an undertaking would, of
course, be vast, since many of the myriad issues discussed herein
would individually merit article-length treatment. This article,
which will appear in two parts, is in the nature of an overview,
suggesting subjects for further exploration and refinement. With
the caveat that attempts at categorization may be arbitrary and
of necessity overlap, Part 1 of this article will address the ques
tion of corporate law reform in Mississippi in the areas of corpo
rate formation and organization and corporate management and
governance. Part 2, to be published in a subsequent issue, will

po
no�e 3, at 1410, 1427-28 (severe imbalance of management lawyers in committee com
7
_
Comment, L aw fo r Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 11
s1t1on);
led
s
ha
es
L. REV. 861, 872-75 (1969)(three-way arrangement of corporate structur
U.
w
to 1�creased management power at expense of public shareholder) . Of course, this vie
has '�elf been q�estioned and criticized . See, e.g., Fischel, The "Race to the B ott om"
.
Revisited:
Refiectlons on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1 3, 916-21 (1982)(theoretical and empirical evidence does not support att ack

�A.

�

.
eth
on separation of o�ersh1p and control) [hereinafter cited as Fischel, Refiecti ons]; H
48
-2
_
235
eringt on, Rede�rung the Task of Corporation Law, 19 U.S.F.L. REv. 229,
(1985)(assumptions regarding traditional corporate model were largely mistaken).
re
A related but broader issue is that of the respective roles of management and sha 
.
con

holders m corporate g?v er ?ance and the necessity uel non of stricter standards of
�uc t for managers. This will be further developed at infra notes 67-173 and accompany

ing text.
" Indeed, Pr �f � or O'Neal has noted the possible "big business bias" of the
all
MBCA. ased �8 it 18 on the Model Act and made applicable to both large and s m

�

corporat ions 0 Neal, Preventative Law, supra note 12, at 534 n.24 .
.
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discuss the areas of capitalization, organic changes, and issues of
particular concern to close corporations.

FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION

I.

A.

Process of Incorporation

Among the most salutary changes which would be effected
by the RMA are those in the area of corporate formation. In
general, the RMA would effectively accomplish three objectives:
(1) streamlining and simplifying a procedure that is currently
unjustifiably cumbersome; (2) responding to interpretative is
sues that arose under the Model Act; and (3) clearly defining the
legal role of the Secretary of State in the incorporation process.
The MBCA follows a very traditional statutory scheme of
incorporation: articles of incorporation including prescribed in
formation18 must be signed and verified by two incorporators17
and duplicate originals delivered to the Secretary of State.18 As
suming that the Secretary determines that the articles "conform
to law," the certificate of incorporation is issued and returned
together with a duplicate original of the articles.1 9 Although the
publication requirement was eliminated in 1983,20 the certificate
must be recorded in the chancery clerk's office in the county of
the corporation's principal place of business.21 Upon issuance of
the certificate, the corporation is deemed to exist.22
The thrust of Chapter 1 of the RMA is twofold: to eliminate
much of what is unnecessary under traditional statutes such as
the MBCA, and to provide needed clarification and definition to
much that previously was unstated or ambiguous. For example,
under the RMA only one incorporator is required, and the incor-

19
17

Miss.
Miss.

CODE
CODE

the age of 21. Id.
18
Miss. CODE
lt

10
11
11

ANN. § 79-3-105 (1972).
ANN.§ 79-3-103 (1972 ). The incorporators must
ANN.§

be natural persons of

79-3-107 (1972).

Id.

1983 Miss. Laws 403, § 2, amending Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-3-107 (1972).
Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-01 (1972 ).
Miss. CODE ANN.§ 79-3-109. A s to the relationship of this section to common

law
doctrines of de ju re and de facto corporations and corporation by estoppel see infra
notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
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porator can be either a person or an entity. 23 Only one original
and one conformed copy need be filed, 24 and the a rticles need
not be verified. 211 The prescribed information in the articles is
greatly reduced,26 and the corporate existence made perpetual
unless otherwise provided. 27 There is no necessity to include a
purpose clause unless a more limited purpose than the transac-

23

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT §§ 1.40, 2.02 (1984). Given the purely formal

and limited nature of the incorporator's role under modern statutes, and the pervasive
use of corporation service companies in interstate incorporation transactions, there ap
pears no need to have a natural person as incorporator, and certainly n o rationale to
require more than one. The Model Act's historical justification for requiring multiple
incorporators (the 1950 Model Act required three) appears to have been a somewhat
irrational prejudice against "one-person" corporations. See Garrett, supra note 3, at 3
(requirement of multiple inc orporators is firm l y established in most states although re
garded

as

fictional in many cases).

Curiously, the RMA is ambiguous in one respect: it sets no minimum age for an
individual to be either an incorporator or a director. REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CORP. ACT
§§ 2.01, 8.03 (1984). While the RMA permits corporations to prescribe qualifications for
members of the board, it is unclear whether this contemplates a minimum age limitation.

See id. § 8.02 & official comment. Under present Mississippi law, incorporators must be
21 and directors 18. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-67, -103 (197 2 and Supp. 1985). Quaere
whether the common law age of capacity, 21, would impliedly prohibit a younger person
from serving in these capacities.
u REVISED MODEL BUSINESS Co RP. ACT § l.20 (i)(1984). A duplicate original can , of
course, suffice as a conformed copy. Id. official comment.
•a Id. § l.20(g). The RMA makes verification or acknowledgement optiona l for all
documents filed pursuant thereto. Id.
16
The articles need state only the corporate name, number (but not par value) of
authorized shares, street address of the initial registered office and initial registered
agent; and name and address of each incorporator. Id. § 2.02(a). All other informatio n
and provisions are optional. Of course, certain provisions must appear in the articles if
they are to apply. Provisions which are mandatory are those regarding a limited purpose;
managing the business and affairs of the corporation; defining, limiting, and regulating
the powers of the corporation, board, or shareholders; par value of shares; and imposition

of personal liability on shareholders. Id. § 2.02(b)(2)(i).(u).
11
Id. § 3.02. Like the MBCA, the R M A contains an extensive grant of general pow
ers; these need not be repeated in the articles. Id. § 2.02(c); see M iss. CODE ANN.§ 79-3- 7
(197 2). The broad powers of § 3.02, coupled with the adoption of a n "any lawful busi·

ness" purpose provision, should virtually eliminate the possibility of an ultra vires att ack
on a transaction, unless of course the corporation has elected to limit its purpose. RE
VISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 3.02 official comment (1984); see infra note 28 (gen
eral powers of corporation). Nonetheless, the RMA retains a provision defin ing the scope
of the ultra vires doctrine. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 3.0 4 (1984). The Mis
sissippi provision is substantially the same. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-11 (1972).
should be noted that the adoption of the RMA in this regard would require con·
u
s 1tut1onal amendment, since "private corporation[s)
for pecuniary gain" are constit
t1onally limited in Mississippi to a duration of 99 years.
Miss. CONST. art. 7, § 178.

. I�
�
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tion of "any lawful business" is desired. 28 The Secretary of
State's duty of filing is ministerial in nature; no longer is he re
quired to determine if the articles conform to law.29 In addition,
the Secretary is not required to issue a certificate of incorpora
tion, b ut rather only to return the document copy to the corpo
ration. so The articles are effective and the corporate existence
begins upon filing, unless a delayed effective time and date are

••

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§

3.0l(a) {1984). The RMA deems a corpora

tion to be organized for any lawful purpose unless a more restricted purpose is stated in
the articles. Id.

§

2.02(b)(l).

While restrictive purpose clauses may sometimes be used to protect the interests of
minority shareholders, the mandate f o r the specific purpose clause under the MBCA may
serve no rational function, other than to test the ingenuity of drafters to phrase the
purpose for which the corporation is organized in sufficiently broad terms to permit the
transaction of any lawful business. See Miss. CoDE ANN.

§

79-3-105(c) (1972)(specific

purpose or purposes for which corporation is organized shall be s e t forth, stated in gen
eral terms). Any supposed informational function

to shareholders

is negated by the fact

that few, if any, shareholders of any corporation, whatever its size, ever examine its arti
cles. Moreover, elimination of any requirement of specificity removes the possibility of a
drafter unwittingly creating a potential ultra vires challenge.
Currently at least 34 states permit the use of "any lawful purpose" or similar
clauses. ALA. CODE

§
ANN., §§
CoDE

§

10-2A-91 (1980); ARIZ. REv.

202 (West 1977); CoLO. REv. STAT.

§

STAT.

ANN.

§

10-054 (1977); CAL. CORP.

STAT.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §

7-2-102 (Supp. 1985); CoNN. GEN.

33-290 (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (1983);

HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-11 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE§ 30-1-54
STAT. ch. 32, 11 2.10 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-22-l(a)
(Burns Supp. 1986); low A CODE ANN. § 496A.49 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT ANN. § 176002 (1981); Kv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.270 (Baldwin 1983); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12.24
(West 1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1202 (West 1973); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1202 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2052 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.035 (1985); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 293-A:54 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 14A:2-7, 14A:3-1(2) (West 1969);
N . M. STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2 {1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402 (McK inney 1986); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-7 (1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 1701.04 (Page 1985); OR. REV. STAT.§
57-311 (1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1204, 1302 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 71.1-48 (1985); TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 3.02 (Vernon 1980); VA. CODE § 13.1-626
(Repl. Vol. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A:12.020 (Supp. 1986); Wisc. STAT. ANN.§
180.45 (West 1957); Wvo. STAT.§ 17-1-202 (1977). The new Tennessee Business Corpora
607.164 (West 1977);

(1980); ILL. ANN.

tion Act, effective O ctober 1, 1987, enacts the RMA provision. 1986 Tenn. Pub. Acts 887,
§ 3.01.
38

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT

§

1.25(d) & official comment 1 (1984); see

infra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
ao

The need for f ormal certificates of corporate acts is unclear, and the RMA wisely

eliminates the requirement that the S e cretary issue certificates of incorporation, merger,
or similar documents. REVISED MooEL B U SINESS CORP. ACT.
3 (1984).

§

1.25(b) & official comment

[VOL. 56
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specified in the articles.31 The RMA does not require either pub
lication of notice or recording in any public office other than
that of the Secretary of State. The provisions of the RMA and
MBCA dealing with the organizational meeting and adoption of
bylaws are substantively similar. 32

B.

Secretary of State

In addition to miscellaneous simplifying provisions,33 a sec
ond major contribution of the RMA is the clarification of the
role of the Secretary of State. Early corporate statutes com
monly provided for substantive review of articles of incorpora
tion by a state official.34 As previously noted, the MBCA charges
the Secretary of State with the responsibility of determining
that articles of incorporation "conform to law" before issuance

•1 Id. §§ 1.23, 2.03(a). The RMA requires the Secretary to maintain a date and time
stamp that will eliminate any ambiguities as to effective time. Id. § l.23(a) & official

comment. Filing is made conclusive proof that all conditions precedent to incorporation
have been met, except in proceedings brought by the state. Id. § 2.03(b). As to the effect
of the RMA on the issue of preincorporation transactions, see

infra

notes 53-66 and

accompanying text.

12 Compare REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 2.05-2.06 (1984)(wh ere initia l
directors are named they shall hold organizational meeting of majority of direct ors; in

corporators on board of directors shall adopt initial bylaws)

with

Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 79-

3-51, -113 (1972)(bylaws adopted by board which also has power to amend or repeal
unless power is reserved to shareholders; organizational meeting shall b e called by major
ity of incorporators and three days notice thereof shall be given by mail). In addition,
the RMA includes a provision dealing with emergency bylaws which does not appear in
the MBCA but which has been adopted in a number of states. REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS
CORP. ACT § 2.07 (1984).
de
0 E.g., the RMA allows a document containing an " incorrect statement " or one
fectively executed to be corrected by filing "articles of correction," thus eliminating the
necessity of either refiling or submitting formal articles of amendment to correct minor
errors . REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. A CT § l.24(a) (1984). The correction relates back
to the date of the original filing except as to persons who detrimentally rely upon the
original document before correction. Id. § 1.24(c). In addition, the RMA permits a corpo
r�tion to change its registered office o r agent simply by filing a statement of change

�1thout

�

any s areholder or formal board action. Id. § 5.02. Under the MBCA, this seem

mgly mechamcal act can be accomplished only by formal resolution of the board and
subsequent filing with the Secretary of State. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-23 (1972). There
appears to be no reason for formal documentation of board approval for this to be
effected.
••

See, e.g.,

Roberds, supra note 12, at 179-80 (noting authority of governor to regu

l�te amount of paid-in capital before approving charter under 1 9 28 Mississippi Corpora
tion Act).
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of the charter.36 The scope of the Secretary of State's duties
under such provisions is somewhat unclear: is he merely to re
view the charter for technical compliance with the minimum
standards o f the Act, or is he also charged with determining the
substantive legality or relevance of provisions which may go be
yond the b are statutory requirements? If the latter is the stat
ute's meaning, one may then question whether the Secretary of
Sta te's office is adequately staffed to render a competent judg
ment on such matters, as well as the appropriateness o f granting
the Secretary broad substantive discretion in such areas. Ex
isting case law on these issues, unsurprisingly, has y ielded some
times contradictory results. 36

•a Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-107 (Supp. 1986). Similar language is employed regarding
articles of amendment, restated articles of incorporation, amendment o f articles of incor
poration in reorganization, statements of reduction in capital, articles of merger or con
solidation, articles of merger of a 95% subsidiary, articles of dissolution by act of the
incorporators, shareholders or corporation, revocation of dissolution proceedings, appli
cation for certificate of authority of a foreign corporation, application for withdrawal of a
foreign corporation, and annual reports. Id. § § 79-3-121, -127, -129, -137, -147, -149, -163,
-165, - 169, -179, - 1 85, -221, -234, -251 (1972 and Supp. 1986).

Currently at least 21 states have adopted comprehensive provisions dealing with the
Secretary of State's duty in filing documents. ALA. CooE § 10-2A-93 (1980); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 64-1 17 ( 1980); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1 10 (West 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33285 (West 1960); DEL. ConE AN N. tit. 8, § 103 (1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-5 (1982);
Iow A CODE ANN. § 496A.53 (West 1962); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6003 (1981); Mn. CORPS. &
Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § § 1-201, -202, -204 (1985); MASS. GEN. L AWS ANN. ch 1568, § 6 (West
1970); MICH. COMP. L AWS ANN. § 450.1131 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.Oll(ll)
(West 1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 104 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-4 (1982);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.08 (Page 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1010 ( Purden 1967);
S.C. CooE ANN. § 33-1-60 (Law. Co-op 1977); 1 986 TENN. Pue. AcTS 887, § 1.35 (effective
Oct. 1, 1987); WASH. REv. ConE ANN . § 23A.04.010(9)(17)(Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
180.86 (West 1957). The standards expressed defining the scope of the secretary's discre
tion varies somewhat from state to state; in some, no standard whatsoever is defined.
ae E
.g., compare State ex rel. Grant v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 1 1 2, 313 N.E.2d 847,
848 (1974)(upholding authority of secretary to refuse articles of incorporation of non
profit corporation whose purpose was the promotion of homosexuality on grounds that
this was unlawful and contravened public policy) with Gay Activitists Alliance v.
Lomenzo, 31 N. Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 256 (1973)(secretary wrongfully refused arti
cles of incorporation of nonprofit corporation with purpose of seeking repeal of laws dis
criminating against homosexuals; secretary lacked authority to determine that certain
purposes violate public policy or that proposed names are inappropriate).
For other examples, see Smith v. Director, Corporate & Sec. Bureau, 79 Mich. App.
107, 261 N.W.2d 228, 230-31 (1977)(state official had authority to reject article stating
purpose of lending money at interest rates in excess of seven percent, then maximum
rate permitted under Michigan's usury law); Coal Harbor Stock Farm, Inc. v. Meier, 191
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The RMA provides that the Secretary has an express duty
to file all documents which satisfy the requirements of the Act,37
and that this duty is "ministerial."38 By so doing, the RMA lim
its the Secretary's discretion to matters of technical compliance.
Thus, he would have no authority to reject a document because
he believes that it contains provisions that are irrelevant or that
violate legal principles not contained in the Act. 39 The RMA
properly recognizes that the Secretary's office is not the appro
priate forum for such challenges to corporate documents.
Another area in which the proper role of the Secretary has
engendered controversy is that of corporate names. As is true of
the vast majority of state statutes,40 the MBCA requires that a
corporation's name include words denoting corporateness, i.e.,
corporation, company, incorporated, or limited, or an abbrevia
tion thereof.•1 The RMA maintains this requirement.42 By far
the most common problem in the area of corporate names, how
ever, is that of similarity to that of an existing corporation cur
rently registered in the state. The MBCA provides that a corpo
rate name must not be "the same as, or deceptively simi lar to,"
that of an existing domestic corporation or a previously qualified

N.W.2d 583, 588 (N.D. 1971)(articles of corporation with purpose of farming prope rly
rejected where statutes prohibited all but qualified cooperative corporations from engag
ing in farming and limited power to own rural real estate); LeForce v. Bullard, 45 4 P.2d
297, 304 (Okla. 1969) (secretary wrongfully refused to file articles of farming corporation
on ground that state constitution and statutes prohibited a corporation from farmi�g
since they prohibited corporate ownership of land; corporation can be formed 10
Oklahoma for general purpose of engaging in farming with power of owning real estate);
State ex rel. Church v. Brown, 165 Ohio St. 31, 133 N.E.2d 333, 335-36 (1956)(se cretarY
properly rejected articles of corporation whose purpose was to provide private facilities
for the practice of nudism; formation of corporation would violate indecent exposure
statute).
., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § l .25 (a) (1984). In order to be eligible for
.
fihng,
all docu�ents must contain the information required by the RMA and conform to
_ al requirements
technic
of form and execution. Id. § 1.20.
H Id. § l.25 (d).
"" Id. § 1.25 official comment 1.

e
'° Only Maine, Massachusetts,
Utah, and Wyoming have no such general requir
§
ment. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 301 (1981);
B,
11
MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 15 6
(West 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-7 ( 1 973); Wvo.
STAT. § 1 7-1-107 (1977).
41 Mis s. CODE ANN. § 79-3-1
3(a)( 1972 ).
••

REVISED MODEL BusINEss CoRP. ACT § 4.0l(a
).
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foreign corporation.3
4 The use of a "deceptive similarity" stan
dard, however, may suggest an inappropriate overlap with the
law of unfair competition. Under both the federal and Missis
sippi trademark statutes, the general test for registrability of a
trademark is that it not "be likely ... to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive.""' Inherent in the "likelihood of
confusion" test applied under trademark law, however, is not
only similarity in name but also the competitive n ature of the
businesses pursued by competing claimants.�
'
In some instances courts have held that unfair competition
standards govern the results under corporate name statutes as
well.'6 The resources of the Secretary of State may, however, be
inadequate to make such a judgment, and the possibility of in
consistency is evident.7
4 The RMA adopts the test "distinguisha
ble upon the records of the Secretary of State" for determining
the right to use

a

corporate name. This formulation makes it

clear that similarity in an absolute or linguistic sense, and not
confusion, is the appropriate test since the function of requiring

0

Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3- 13(c)(1972).

0

15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)(1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-3(f)(1972). Unlike many

states, Mississippi has no statute dealing with the registration of trade or assumed
nanies. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & Paor. CODE §§ 14411-417 (West Supp. 1 986)(filing of ficti
tious name raises rebuttable presumption of exclusive right to use

as

trade name); CONN.

GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-1 (West Supp. 1986)(assumed name under which business is to be
conducted must be filed); Mien.

COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1-445.5 (West Supp.

1986)(same); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 130 (McKinney Supp. 1986)(same); VA. CooE ANN. §§
59.1-69 to 59.1-76 (1982 & Supp. 1986)(same).
41

See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified Packaging, 549 F.2d 368, 388 (5th

Cir. 1977)(confusion with respect to product's source, its indorsement by plaintiff, or its
connection with plaintiff).
••

See, e.g., Couhig's Restaway Co. v. Pestaway, Inc., 278 So. 2d 519, 521 (La. App.

1973)(substantially same test as applied in determining infringement of proprietary right
to trade name).

'7 An interesting case illustrating this point is Ergon, Inc. v. Dean, 649 S.W.2d 772
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983). Ergon, Inc., a Mississippi corporation, qualified to do business in
Texas in 1973. Id. at 774. In 1978, the Secretary of State of Texas issued a charter to
Nova Energy C orporation, which shortly thereafter changed its name to Ergon Energy
Corporation. Id. Both Ergon and Ergon Energy were engaged in similar businesses. Id. at
775. Ergon sought to compel the Secretary to revoke approval of Ergon Energy's corpo

rate name and also relief under the Federal Trademark Act. Id. at 773. The court, rely
ing heavily upon regulations promulgated by the Secretary, upheld his decision to allow
Ergon Energy to use its corporate name, but further held that Ergon Energy had in
fringed upon Ergon's federal trademark. Id. at 776-80.
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distinguishable names in a corporate statute is to prevent confu
sion by the Secretary and taxing authorities, and to permit accu
rate service of process.48 Under the RMA, no issues of the appro
corporate
between
relationship
priate
competition standards should arise.•11

law

and

unfair

The RMA contains a number of clarifying features not pre
sent in earlier versions of the Model Act. One is an extensive set
of definitions.110 Perhaps even more helpful is a prescribed proce
dure for giving notice and rules defining when notice becomes
effective.111 The RMA also relieves the Secretary of State of an
unnecessary responsibility by providing that in the event that
service of process cannot be made on a corporation's registered
agent, the corporation can be served by registered or certified
mail addressed to the secretary of the corporation at its princi
pal office shown in its most recent annual report.112

••

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP.

••

The RMA carries forward other provisions from the 1969 Model Act relating to

AcT.

§ 4.01 & official comment 2 (1984).

corporate names which would be desirable additions to Mississippi Jaw. The first is a
consent procedure to permit the use of similar names. The 1969 Model Act allowed a
corporation to use a name that would be otherwise unavailable if it could obtain the
written consent of the holder of the conflicting name and, if necessary, add one or more
§
words to the new name to make it distinguishable. MoDEL Bus1NESS CORPORATION Acr
8(c)(l969). A majority of states have adopted this or similar provisions. 1 REVISED M oDEL
has
BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 252 (1985). While the Secretary of State of Mississippi
ub
s
The
followed this practice on an informal basis, a codified procedure is preferable.
§
cr
A
oRP.
C
stance of the 1969 amendment is incorporated in REVISED MoDEL BUSINESS
if
e
4.0l(c) (l )(1984). In addition, the RMA authorizes the use of an indistin guishable nam
.
ght
the applicant can produce a judgment of a court of final jurisdiction establishing its ri

to the name. Id. § 4.0l(c)(2).
The pro�isions of the MBCA and RMA dealing with reserved and registered names
a�e substantially the same; the primary difference is that the RMA makes the reserva
( 1 972
tion of a corporate name nonrenewable. Compare Miss.
CODE ANN. § § 79-3 -15, -17
& Supp. 1985)(name reserved for period of 180 days) with REVISED MoDEL Busnmss
CORP. A
§§ 4.02, 4.03 (1984)(only single, one time reservation of 120 days is provided) .
. �
ation
Nothmg m the RMA, however, prohibits a n
applicant from reapplying for reserv
upon lapse, nor from forming an inactive corporation
to a
to maintain perpetual rights
nam REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT
§ 4.02 official comment ( 1984).
;
See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 1.40 (1984)(definitions of terms used
throughout Model Act collected in single
section).
01•
ws are
Id. § 1.41. Notice provisions included
in a corporation's articles or byla
effec ve to the extent that they are not
.
inconsistent with the A ct. Id. § 1.4l (g)
.
e 18
Id. § 5.o4(b) & official comment.
Under the MBCA the Secretary of Stat
.
.
t be
deemed to be a corporat1'on's agent
wh en a registered agent 1s not appomted or canno
crefound. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-25
e
(1972). Service must therefore be made on the S

�

;:

·
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Liability for Preincorporation Obliga tions

One of the most troublesome interpretative questions aris
ing under earlier versions of the Model Act was its impact on the
problems falling within the general rubric of defective incorpora
tion. The classic case involved liabilities incurred before all for
mal conditions precedent to incorporation were met. The com
mon law addressed the question of the potential liability of
individuals acting on the corporation's behalf by the doctrines of
de jure corporation, de facto corporation, or corporation by es
toppel. So long as substantial compliance with the necessary
steps to incorporation was effected, a de jure corporation would
exist which was generally immune from either d irect or collat
eral attack by the state or any other party.63 Conversely, al
though the substantial compliance standard was not met, courts
would recognize a de facto corporation where

(1)

there was a

statute under which the corporation might have been validly or
ganized,

(2)

statute, and

a colorable attempt was made to comply with the

(3)

there was some exercise of corporate powers. A

de facto corporation was safe from collateral challenge but could
be attacked directly by the state in a quo warranto or similar

tary, who forwards it to the corporation at its registered office. Id. No reason for the
Secretary's intervention appears to exist.

A related technical problem exists concerning the resignation of a registered agent.

Under the MBCA a resigning agent is to notify the Secretary, who then sends a copy of
the notice to the corporation "at its registered office. " Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-23 (1972).
In many instances, however, that will be the address of the resigning agent, with the

anomalous result that the resigning agent receives the notice of its resignation. Thus, the
RMA provides for the Secretary to forward the notice to the corporation's registered
office, if not discontinued, and to its principal office
VISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 5.03(b)(l984).
Ila

as

shown on its annual report. RE

8 w. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 3799 (rev.

perm. ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as W. FLETCHER); A. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF

CORPORATIONS § 139, at 327-28 (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited
Of course, this begs the question somewhat

88

88

HENN & ALEXANDER].

to what constitutes "substantial compli

ance." One standard sometimes articulated is that the noncompliance be "slight." A.

FREY, J. CHOPER, N. LEECH & C. MORRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 34 (2d
ed. 1977). A distinction is sometimes drawn between "directory" and "mandatory" provi

sions, a directory provision being an inconsequential one, noncompliance with which

does not prejudice any public interest. W. FLETCHBR. supra, § 3800; HENN & ALEXANDER,
supra, at 328. An example would be the incorrect street address of an incorporator. For

examples of other directory provisions see lA W. Fl.ETcHER, supra, § 132.
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action.114 Finally, regardless of the degree of compliance with in
corporation procedures, one dealing with a purported corpora
tion could, under the principle of corporation by estoppel, be
precluded from denying its existence.1111
The former Model Act contained two provisions relating to
these issues. Section 56 provided:
Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the
corporate existence shall begin, and such certificate of incorpo
ration shall be conclusive evidence that all conditions prece
dent required to be performed by the incorporators have been
complied with and that the corporation has been incorporated
under this Act, except as against this State in a proceeding to
cancel or revoke the certificate of incorporation or for involun
tary dissolution of the corporation.ae

Section 146 of the Model Act provided that " (a]ll persons who
assume to act as a corporation without authority so to do shall
be jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities in
curred or arising as a result thereof."117
The drafters of the Model Act took the position that these
sections abrogated the de facto corporation concept and that
nothing less than full compliance with the statute could create a
corporation. 58 Given the simplicity of the incorporation proce-

.. 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 3761; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 14o,
ion
at 329-330. The doctrine of de facto corporation has
also been applied where a condit
In
precedent to doing business, as opposed to incorporatio
.g.,
e
See,
met.
n has not been
UJJl
re Es�te
Har in, 218 So. 2d 889, 891 (Miss. 1969)(f ilure to comply with minim
_
paid
n capital did not deprive corporation of de
facto status ).
�
§
W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, §§ 3889,
3910; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53,
the
141• at 3 5- In a dition, those acting as a
g
nyin
de
from
corporation may be estopped
,
corporation s existence. W. FLETCHER, supra
upra
note 53, § 3930; HENN & ALEXANDER. s
note 53 • § l 41; see, e.g., Taylor v.
2 33
33
,
Aldridge, 180 Miss. 635 , 643, 178 So. 331
:
(l938H�ennessee corporation doing business
eign
for
as
g
ifyin
in Mississippi without qual
corp atJon estopped from denying
its existence).
.
M ?DE7 BUSINESS CORP. Ac-r § 56
with
(1969). Mississippi adopted this provision
the sub&t1tutton of the word "chapt
er" for "Act.,, MISS. C ODE A NN. § 79 -3-109 (197 2).
. 17 M ODEL BUSINESS CORP.
Ac-r § 146 ( 1969). Mississippi adopted this provision with
out
ange. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3 -285
( 1972).
The comment to § 56 state
.
der the
. d that "a de facto corporat10n
cannot ex1st un
,,
Model Act. MODEL BUSINESS
s
CORP. Ac-r § 56 comment ( 1 969). Moreover, the drafter
stated that the purpose 0f §
e
d
.
.
146 was " to proh1b1t the application of any theory of
facto corporation." Id. §
146 comment. Other authorities have commonly agreed. See,

0�

�

!

�

�

�

�

�

·
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dure under the Model Act, the logic of this argument seems
sound. Nonetheless, not all courts have accepted the dictum of
the

drafters,

the

Supreme

Court of Mississippi

being an

example.�9
By far the more troublesome question is whether the doc
trine of corporation by estoppel was affected by the Model Act
and similar state statutes. Since the doctrine is eq uitable in na
ture and is based on a course of conduct rather than any ques
tion of statutory compliance, a convincing argument could be
made that it was not abrogated by the Model Act. Two well
known cases, decided in the same year, reached opposite conclu
sions on the issue. In Robertson v. Levy,t•0 the C ourt of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held that the Model Act abrogated
both the doctrines of de facto corporation and corporation by
estoppel. Noteworthy in that case, however, was that the person
acting o n behalf of the purported corporation was aware that the
charter had not been issued at the time that the obligation was
incurred. Conversely, in Cranson v. International Business Ma
chin es Corp. ,81 the Supreme Court of Maryland applied the doc
trine of corporation by estoppel despite the presence of a statute
substantively identical to Section 56 of the Model Act. In that
case, however, the individual defendant was unaware of the non
existence of the corporation, the party at fault being his lawyer
who had failed for seven months to file the articles. Subsequent
cases have split on the issue,82 although some states have ex-

e.g., 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 3762.1.
61

See In re Estate of Hardin, 218 So. 2d 889, 891 (Miss. 1 969)(failure to comply

with minimum paid-in capital did not deprive corporation of de facto status); Gulf Land
& Dev. Co. v. McRaney, 197 So. 2d 212, 217 (Miss. 1967)(de facto corporation exists
where good faith attempt made under existing Jaws to organize corporation for specific
purpose and corporation has exercised corporate functions for indefinite time).
eo

197 A.2d 443 (D.C.C. App. 1964), noted in 43 N.C.L. REV. 206 (1964). But see

Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 112 (D.C. App. 1966)(corporation by estoppel
applied ).
-. 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33 (1964), noted in 10 Vn.L. L. Rsv. 166 (1964).
19

E.g., compare Thompson & Green Mach. v. Music City Lumber Co., 683 S.W.2d
340, 344 (Tenn. App. 1984)(both de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel elimi
nated in Tennessee) with Harris v. Stephens Wholesale Bldg. Supply Co., 54 Ala. App.
405, 309 So. 2d 115, 117-18 (1975) and Cantor v. Sunshine Greenery, Inc., 165 N.J.
Super. 4 1 1 , 398 A.2d 571, 573 (1979)(both applying corporation by estoppel).
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pressly preserved the estoppel doctrine by statute. 63
The RMA clarifies the intent of former section 146 by now
providing that " [a]ll persons purporting to act as or on behalf �f
a corporation, knowing there was no incorporation under this
Act, are jointly and severally liable for all liabilities created

while so acting."8' The drafters of the RMA concluded as a pol
icy matter that in certain situations the recognition o f limited
liability would be appropriate notwithstanding the failure to
comply with statutory formalities, with the overriding considera
tion being the good faith of the persons so acting.86 The RMA,
then, strikes an appropriate balance between the interests of
participants in the corporate enterprise and third parties dealing
with it, and is consistent with recent decisions of the Mississippi
Supreme Court dealing with liability of persons who conduct
business after the suspension of a corporation's charter.88

11

An earlier Minnesota statute preserved both de facto corporation and corporation

by estoppel. MINN.

STAT.

ANN. § 301.08 (West 1980),

repealed by

1981 M1NN.

LAWS

270, §

142. The comments to its present act take the position that the de facto corporation
doctrine has been eliminated, but that the estoppel doctrine is unaffected. Reporter's

Notes to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A .1 53 (West 1985). The Georgia Corporation Code pro·
videa that "(t]he existence of a corporation claiming a charter under color of law cann ot
be collaterally attacked by persons who have dealt with it as a corporation. Such persons
are eatopped from denying its corporate existence." G A CODE ANN. § 14-5-4 ( 1982). In
.

Cahoon

v.

Ward, 23 1 Ga. 872, 204 S.E.2d 622, 624-25 ( 1974), the Supreme Court of Geor

gia construed this

aa

preserving the doctrine of corporation by estoppel which would

otherwise have been eliminated by adoption of provisions identical to Model Act Sec
tions 56 and 146. But see Don Swann Sales Corp. v. Echols, 160 Ga. App. 539, 287 S .E.2d
577, 580 (1981)(corporation by estoppel should not be applied to protect individ ual p ur
porting to act for non-existent corporation from liability on contract executed in corpo
ration'11 name).

" RBvlHll

Moon BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 2.04 ( 1984) (emphasis added) .
.. Id. official comment. As the comment notes, equivalent protection is accorded to
limited partners who contribute capital in the erroneous belief that the certificate of
limited partnership has been filed. See, e.g., Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-13-23 ( 1972) (contribu·

tor to capital of business erroneously believing he has become limited partner is not
bound by partnership provided he renounces his interest in profits of business).

Moreover, the comments state that, despite the lack of specific language to this ef
§ 2.04 is not intended to foreclose the application of estoppel in instances where the
defendants are urged to execute contracts in the corporate name by persons who are

fect,

aware that no corporation exists. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 2.04 official com·
ment (1984).
" Compare Carolina Transformer Co. v. Anderson, 341 So. 2d 1327, 1 329-30 (Miss.
1977)(owner and officer of corporation suspended for failure to file annual report liable
under I 79·3-285 on contracts made in corporation's name after suspension) with Flana·
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In summary, the provisions of Chapters 1 through 5 of the
RMA provide a desirable basis for revision of the Mississippi
Act. The RMA effectively accomplishes the dual goals of simpli
fication and clarification of traditional laws dealing with the in
corporation process.
II.

A.

CORPORATE MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE

Composition and Structure of Board of Directors

The provisions of the RMA dealing with directors reflect
not only widespread statutory developments but, in some in
stances, innovations not yet commonly found in state general
corporation statutes. A striking example of the latter is the abil
ity, under some circumstances, to eliminate the board of direc
tors entirely or limit its authority by provisions in the articles
describing who is to perform all or part of the board's duties.
This election is limited to corporations with fifty or fewer share
holders.67 While this is obviously practicable only for a close cor
poration, the RMA would permit such action even in a state like
Mississippi with no separate close corporation statute.68

gan v. Jackson Wholesale Bldg. Supply Co., 461

So. 2d 761, 764-65 (Miss. 1984)(wife of

deceased owner of suspended corporation, though director, not liable since she was not
actively involved in the control and management of corporation, notwithstanding that
corporation and its finances were intertwined with her household).
•1 REVISED MODEL BusINESS CoRP. Acr § 8.0l(c)(1984). Such provisions are not, of
course, uncommon in states with separate close corporation statutes. See, e.g. , DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 351 ( 1983)(permitting management by shareholders). Related issues will be
discussed in greater depth in

Part 2 of this article.

A more radical approach is taken in Minnesota, where any business corporation can

be managed by its shareholders. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.201, 302A.457 (West 1985).
The limitation in the RMA is consistent with the Close Corporation Supplement to the
Model Act, which authorizes the elimination of the board in a statutoey close corporation
hut would allow only existing corporations with 50 or fewer shareholders to amend its
articles to elect close corporation status. MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CoRP. SUPPLEMENT §§
3(b), 21 ( 1983). An unusual feature of the supplement is that it would permit a new
corporation to elect such status without regard to the number of shareholders. Id. § 3(a).
.. The avowed purpose of the drafters of the RMA is to avoid the necessity of
manipulating a corporation's capital structure in order to achieve a similar result. The
classic case is Lehrmann

v.

Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800

(1966 ) , which upheld

the issuance to the corporation's attorney of a class of voting common stock without a
significant equity interest in order to create a tie-breaking vote on the board. The RMA
would permit the same result by express provision in the articles, without the necessity
of creating a special class of stock. REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. Acr

§ 8.01 official

MISSISSIPPI LA W JOURNAL

184

(VOL. 56

While relatively few corporations might avail themselves of
this option, a provision of much wider appeal in the RMA is the
elimination of the mandatory three member board. Surely no
corp orate practitioner in Mississippi has escaped the problems
posed by the MBCA's insistence on three directors.69 In many
instances, particularly where the corporation has fewer than
three shareholders, this requirement forces the inclusion on the
board of persons with no equity interest and p ossibly no other
financial interest in the corporation. Attorneys particularly are
often put in the awkward position of declining a c lient's request
70
to serve. The potential liability of the inactive director is clear,
but this is not always an easy matter to explain to clients. A
figurehead director in general serves no purpose and the require
7
ment of multiple directors appears purely historical in nature. 1
Thus, the RMA wisely mandates only one director unless the
articles or bylaws provide to the contrary.72

§

comment (1984); cf. id.

7.31 (dealing with voting agreements among shareholders).

For a general discussion of the necessity uel non for a board of directors see Kessler,

Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporat e Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L.

REv. 696 ( 1960). Arguably, the mandate for cumulative voting i� § 194 of the Mississippi
Constitution could prevent outright abolition of the board.
CONST. art. VII, § Hl,4.
Part 2 of this article will consider the desirability of separate close corporation tre atment

Miss.

in Mississippi,

as

well as related issues involving shareholder control devices.

§ 79-3-69 (1972).
See, e.g. , Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814, 829 (198 l) (es
tate of inactive director held liable to bankruptcy trustees of corporation for over
$ l0,000,000 stolen from corporation by other directors). This is not to say, of course, that
attorneys do not often play a useful role as directors of many companies. For a summary
pora te
of arguments both supporting and critici ing this practice
see Comment, Cor
z
Cou el on the Board of Directors: An Overview, 10 CuM.
L. REV. 791 (1980).
7
2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.03, at 805 (1985).
.
1
elimi
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 8.03(a) (l984).
The Model Act first
nated the three-director requirement in 1969.
). At
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 36 (1969
N.
least half the states now permit a one member
AN
board. 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
r
he
8·03• at 808 (l985). For general background
rt
Fu
on the issue see Rudolph,
ho
ts on the On� and Two Director Statutes,
65).
20 Bus. LAW. 781 (19
nefi � MA contains two other provisions concerning board size that would be be
.
cial add1t1ons t Mississippi 's law. Under
d in
xe
fi
the MBCA, the number of directors is
?
the ylaws, which may be amended
the
by
ved
by
the board unless that power is reser
.
c es to the shar �o ders.
CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-51, -69 ( 1 972). In order to prevent
�
bo
ard
fro
ho
� �t1hzmg this power in a way which would fundamentally alter the
'sd comp
ar
the
os1t1on ' the RMA proh'b"ts
I 1
the board from increasing or decreasing
.
e
n mber of directors by more than
30 3 of the number of directors last approved by th
s areholders. REVISED MODEL
A
BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.03(b) ( l 984). In addition , the RM
••

Miss. ConE ANN.

••

�

�

:
�

�:
�

�

�

�1ss.

·
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The RMA contains numerous other provisions which would
effect other desirable changes in the MBCA. For example, the
RMA specifically sanctions the common practice in many states
of allocating among different classes of stock the right to elect
all or a specified number of directors.73 This is presently imper
missible under the MBCA, which prohibits the issuance of com
mon stock with no or limited voting rights, and mandates that
all stock regardless of class (except preferred stock) have one
vote per share on each matter submitted to shareholders.74 This
provision of the RMA might, however, run afoul of the constitu
tional m andate of cumulative voting in Mississippi.76 For rea
sons which will be more fully explained later, this article recom
mends the elimination of mandatory cumulative voting,76 which
would make available this potentially valuable structural device.
Under the MBCA, the power to remove directors77 and to
fill vacancies78 on the board is vested solely in the shareholders.
The RMA would change this in two respects. First, the RMA
provides a machinery for the judicial removal of a director. The
standard for removal is that " ( 1 ) the director engaged in fraudu
lent or dishonest conduct, or gross abuse of authority or discre
tion, with respect to the corporation and (2) removal is in the
best interest of the corporation. "79 The suit may be brought ei
ther by the corporation or by a shareholder suing derivatively on
its behalf, or directly by the holders of ten percent or more of

specifically sanctions the widely used device of providing for a variable size board in the
bylaws. As a matter of shareholder protection, however, once shares are issued only the
shareholders can change the range or change from a fixed to a variable size board, or vice
versa. The specific number of directors within the range would then be determined by
either the shareholders or directors

as

provided in the articles or bylaws. Id. § 8.03(c).

,. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 8.04 (1984). This, of course, is a commonly
used control device in close corporations.

" See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-27, -63 (1972). This is

apparently an outmoded ves

tige of the common law's resistance to severing proprietary rights and control rights.
FREv, CHOPER, LEECH & MORRIS, supra note 53, at 541.

See

" Miss. CONST. art. 7, § 194; see HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 189, at 499
n.33.
Te

See infra

notes 258-68 and accompanying text.

n

Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79-3-75 (1972).

?•

Id. § 79-3-73.

?•

REVISED MooEL BUSINESS CoRP. AcT § 8.09(a)(1984).

MISSISSIPPI LA W JO URNAL

186

[VOL. 56

any class of stock.80 The existence of this power could be signifi
cant, for example, in removing a director elected by cumulative
voting. Under both the RMA81 and the MBCA82, such a director
cannot be removed if votes sufficient for his e lection under cu
mulative voting are cast against his removal. While there is au
thority that a majority of shareholders have inherent power to
remove a director for cause notwithstanding cumulative voting
rights,83 sufficient uncertainty exists on the issue to make an ex
plicit judicial alternative desirable.84
The RMA also permits either the shareholders or directors
to fill a vacancy on the board, unless otherwise provided in the
articles. sr. In light of the logistical difficulties encountered b y
larger corporations in holding shareholders' meetings, this
change in the MBCA86 is recommended, particularly since the
term of the new director is limited to the next shareholders'
meeting at which directors are elected,87 and in all events the
power can be reserved to the shareholders exclusively if
appropriate.88
The RMA also streamlines some functional aspects of boar d
e
A ny such derivative action would be subject to the procedural restric tions of th

'0

RMA . Id. § 7.40.
REVISED MODEL Bus1NEss CORP. A

::

§ 8.08(c)(l984).
CT
A
Miss CoDE ANN: § 79-3-75 (1972). In all material respects, the RMA and MBC
"
.
identical
on the issue of shareholder removal.
are substantively
.. See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36
Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852, 857-58 (1957)(stock
have power to remove director for cause). There is a division of authority on the
holde

�

questio n of a court's general e quity power to remove a d'uector. E.g., compare Brown v.
North Ventura Road De . C o. , 216 Cal . App. 2d 227, 233, 30 Cal. Rptr. 568 , 5 7 1
_
.
( 1 963 ) ( such power exists
independe nt of statute) with
Markovitz v. Mar kovit z, 336 Pa.
.
•
·
·
145 8 A 2d 46 48 (l939)( no sueh inherent powers).
·
,.. As the comments to the RMA pomt out, the p rocedure ma also be practicably
y
·
·
'al
necessary in a publ1"c corporat"1on due to the Iogis
·
t"ICal d'1fficult1es
m effe ct ng a sp ec1

�

�

shareholders' meeting. REVISED MODEL
1 . Busi�ss CORP. AcT § 8 .09 official comment
. .
. .
.
·
( 1 984). Moreover• even absent cumu at1ve voting • super-maJor1ty
prov1s1ons reqmrmg a
.
higher than majority vote for sharehoIder action
may prec1ude removal for cause bY less
than the required percentage . HEN N & ALEXANDER· supra note 53 , § 205, at 559
.
" REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP A
§
onstiCT 8-lO(a). If the remaining directors c
tute less than a quorum , 8 ma}·on' tY of. those remaimng
· have power to fill the vacancy.
.. In Mississippi only shareholders can fill a vacancy. M
1ss . CoDE ANN. § 79- 3 - 7 3
.
al
·
·
·
( 1 972). Again, adoption of the RMA in th"is respect migh
t necessitate constitution
a mendment. See Miss. CONST. art. 7, § 194

.. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. A� § 8 05(d) (198
4) .
·
.. E .g . , m a cIose IY· heId corporation
where 8hareholder action poses
.
no real obstacle.
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operation. For example, the RMA follows the widely-adopted
trend of permitting the directors to meet by conference tele
phone call, with each participating director deemed to be pre
sent as if physically in attendance.89 In addition, while the
RMA, like the MBCA,90 permits directors to act by unanimous
written consent, the RMA specifically recognizes the common
practice of using separate consent forms for all or some direc
tors, and expressly provides that such action is effective upon
the signature of the last director. 91
The formalities of director action would also be affected by
the RMA provisions on the quorum. The MBCA, 92 like the
RMA, permits super-majority provisions in the articles or by
laws increasing the quorum up to and including unanimity.93
Unlike the MBCA, however, the RMA would allow the articles
or bylaws to decrease the quorum to not less than one-third of
the directors. 9' While election of this option would be inappro
priate in most closely-held corporations, the flexib ility it would
accord to public corporations has led to adoption o f similar pro
visions in a substantial number of states.96 This change is there
fore recommended.
An interesting contrast in approach to board functioning
appears in the RMA and MBCA provisions concerning commit
tees. The MBCA requires that authorization for the creation of
committees be made in the articles or bylaws; however, its re
strictions on delegable powers are rather narrow in scope.96 The

11

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 8.20(b)(l984). The statute a ctually speaks

in terms of "any means of communication by which all directors participating may si
multaneously hear each other during the meeting,"· the wording of which would seem to
embrace possible future advances in communications technology. Section 43 of the
Model Act has permitted conference telephone meetings since 1973. See, Report of Co m

mittee on Corporate Laws-Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 29 Bus.
LAW. 947, 948 ( 1974). Mississippi is one of but five states that has no comparable provi

sion. 2 REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. ACT ANN. § 8.20, at 876 (1985).
'0

Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-283 (1972).
" REVISED MODEL BusINESS CoRP. ACT § 8.2l(a), (b)(1984).
11
Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79-3-77 (1972).
91 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 8. 24(a) & official comment ( 1984).
H Id. § 8.24(b).
ea
See 2 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. Acr ANN. § 8.24, at 903 (1985)( overview of
state laws dealing with quorum) .

" Under the MBCA, committees cannot exercise the authority of the board in refer-
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e such commit
RMA, conversel y, empowers the boar d to creat
es or bylaws;97
tees as it desir es unless restricted by the articl
derably more
.
however ' its list of non-delegable functions is consi
.
m
ittees
comm
of
use
ersal
univ
st
detailed.98 In view of the almo
more rea
public corporations, the RMA appr oach appears the
sonable of the two.

B.
1.

Management Duties

Duty of Care.

Section 67 of the MBCA provides that " [T]he business and
affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of direc
tors. "98 Except in limited circumstances, however, the MBCA of
fers no statutory guidance as to the specific content of this duty,
the standard of conduct to which directors are held, or potential

ence to amending the articles of incorporation, adopting a plan of merger or consolida·

tion, recommending to the shareholders the sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or
other disposition of all or substantially all the property and assets of the corporation
otherwise than in the usual and regular course of its business, recommending to the
shareholders a voluntary dissolution of the corporation . or a revocation thereof, or
amending the bylaws of the corporation. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-79 (1972).
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.25(a)(l984).

11
••

Id. § 8.25(e), which provides:

A committee may not, however:
(1) authorize distributions;
(2) approve or propose to shareholders action that this Act requires to

be ap·

proved by shareholders;
(3) fill vacancies on the board of directors or any of its committees;
(4) amend articles of incorporation pursuant to section 10.02;
(5) adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws;
(6) approve a plan of merger not requiring shareholder approval;

(7) authorize or approve reacquisition of shares, except according to a formula

or method prescribed by the board of directors; or
(8) authorize or approve the issuance or sale or contract for sale of shares, or
determine the designation and relative rights, preferences, and limitations of a
class or series of shares, except that the board of directors may authorize a
committee (or a senior executive officer of the corporation) to do so within

limits specifically prescribed by the board of directors.

Id. As with the MBCA, the RMA provides that delegation to a committee does not itself

79·

absolve the directors from their duties of management. Compare Miss. CoDE ANN. §
ty
(1972) (del ati?n "shall not operate to relieve the board . . . of any responsibili
,
1mp�sed by law ) with REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.25(0(1984)(creation
tor
.
�ation to, or action
by committee "does not alone constitute compliance by a direc

�-79

��

with the standards of conduct described in section 8.30").
" Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-67 (Supp. 1985).

del·
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liabilities for failure to meet any such standard as may be im
posed.100 In addition, few Mississippi cases exist on the issue of
mismanagement absent self-dealing or a conflict of interest. 101
Thus there is but little authority concerning two distinct, but
interrelated concepts: the duty of care and the business judg
ment rule.
In its simplest sense, the duty of care recognizes that

as

a

corollary to their duties of management, directors may be liable
to the corporation for negligence in the performance of those du
ties.102 There exists, then, the possibility of liability for waste,

1 00

Specific statutory liability is imposed upon directors who vote for or assent to (1)

payment of an improper dividend or distribution, (2) an improper repurchase of shares,
(3) distribution of assets in liquidation without adequate provisions for corporate obliga

tions, (4) a loan to an officer or director or a loan secured by the corporation's shares, or
(5) the commencement of business before the minimum capital of $1,000.00 has been
paid in for shares. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79-3-91 (1972). This provision is derived from § 48
of the Model Act. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Ar:r § 48 (1969)(providing framework for
first three instances listed above).
10 1
Two leading cases each involve an element of self-dealing. In Landstreet v.
Meyer, 201 Miss. 826, 29 So. 2d 653 (1947), the court held that the minority shareholders
of a corporation had a right to enjoin the payment of the president's salary upon a show
ing that it was clearly excessive and wasteful; however, the president had cast the decid
ing vote on his salary. Id. at 833, 29 So. 2d at 655. In a more recent case, Home Tel. Co.
v. Darley, 355 F. Supp. 992 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 489 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir.
1974), directors were held liable to the corporation for negligence in inducing the corpo
ration to breach a merger agreement; however, in addition to the fact that this action
had no corporate purpose, the court emphasized that the defendants personally benefit
ted from the breach. Darley, 355 F. Supp. at 998. The case is one of very few in Missis
sippi attempting to articulate the business judgment rule: "Although an officer is surely
not liable for honest errors or mistakes in judgment when acting in good faith, this does
not excuse mistakes where the loss is the result of failure to exercise ordinary care, skill

and diligence." Darley 355 F. Supp. at 1000. While the court spoke in terms of negli
gence, however, there was a clear conflict of interest on the part of the defendants which
should have rendered any consideration of the business judgment rule moot. · See infra
text accompanying note 112.
In addition, a number of MiBBiBBippi cases, while not explicitly premised on the busi
ness judgment rule, emphasize the tradition of judicial deference to the concept of ma
jority rule in corporations. See, e.g., Crocker v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 293 So. 2d
438, 442 (Miss. 1974)(court should not enter area of corporate management except in
cases where judicial action is essential to justice); Hudson v. Belzoni Equip. Co., 211
Miss. 178, 188, 51 So. 2d 223, 226 (195l)(courts are not to control corporations except in
cases where such control is essential to justice).
101
See, e.g., HEN N & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 234, at 621. For general back
ground on the topic see 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 1035; Dyson, The Director's
Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 367-71 (1965); Lewis, The Business Judgment
Rule and Corporate Directors ' Liability for Mismanagement, 2 2 BAYLOR L. REv. 157,
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mismanagement, or other acts resulting in loss to the corp?�a
tion even absent self-dealing on the director's part. 103 Jud1c1al
formulations of the content of this duty abound. A common ex
pression of the duty is that care which "ordinarily careful a� d
.
prudent men would use in similar circumstances. " 1 0" The M1ss1s
sippi Supreme Court has described the standard as "that degree
of care in managing [the corporation] that ordinarily prude�t
and diligent men would exercise under similar circumstances m
" �
the conduct and management of their own business. 1 0 The

157-60 (1970).

well-known
The reality of that threat has been the source of no little debate . In a
which im
article, Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr. argued that virtually no cases existed
ut some
posed liability for breach of the duty of care in non-financial corporations witho
argu·
component of self-dealing. Bishop, Sitting Ducks, supra note 14, at 1099. That
uct
Cond
ment, however, has not gone unchallenged. See, e.g., Harris, Standards of
66
61,
.
Under Common Law, Present Day Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. LAW
ers
numb
(1972)(contending that reported cases do not reflect possibility that substantial
that
of such actions may have been settled out of court). Certainly, recent cases suggest
Van
v.
Smith
the duty of care has more than a mere exhortative function. See, e.g.,
ess
busin
ed
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985)(director's duty to exercise inform
432
15,
N.J.
87
Bank,
judgment is in nature of duty of care); Francis v. United Jersey
1 0•

A.2d 814, 824 (1981)(director's duty of care does not exist in abstract).

Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 84, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (1963 ).
101
Boyd v. Applewhite, 121 Miss. 879, 897, 84 So. 16, 23 (1920). It is n oteworthy
that Boyd, a case in which liability was imposed on directors for misman age ment, i�
volved a banking corporation. It is commonly said that bank directors, due to their posi·
tion of public trust, are held to higher standards of accountability than directors of other
businesses. See, e.g., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) (director
of bank, entrusted with funds of depositors and protection of stockholders, is held to
stricter accountability than diretor of ordinary business corporation) ; 3A W. FLETCHER,
supra note 53, §§ 1035, 1042 (undoubtedly director of bank held to stricter accountabil
ity than director of ordinary business corporation); Bishop, supra note 14, at 1098 (bank
director's mismanagement viewed as something worse than ordinary negligence). But see
McDonnell v. American Leduc Petroleums, 491 F.2d 380, 383 (2d Cir. 1 974)(asserting
that standard of care for directors of financial institutions is same as for directors of
1 °'

other corporations).

There is some disagreement as to whether the use of the words " in the conduct and
management of their own business" or similar language has been of significance in any
r�ported c�se i volving director liability. In any event, the clear consensus is that the
�
d1�erence m this and the Model Act standard has no practical importance. See, e.g. ,
Ch1ttur, The Corporate Director's Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future , 10 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 505, 510 & nn . 33-41 (1985)(citing Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 224 A.2d 634

(1966), as. represen ting rare, if not only case in which inclusion of phrase "in their per·
.
sonal business affairs" has been determinative of outcome); Veasey
& Manning, Codified
Standard Safe Harbor or Unchartered Reef? An Analysis of
the Model Act Standard
of Care Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919, 926-27
& n.36 (1979)(same).
·
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level of p erformance required to discharge this duty is, however,
unclear; authorities are divided as to whether ordinary negli
gence , or gross negligence, is the test of liability.106
In many instances, however, the question of the exact pa
rameters of the duty of care is rendered moot because of the
application of the business judgment rule: so long as a decision
of the directors has a rational basis, and was made in good faith
and for what they honestly believed to be in the best interest of
the shareholders, it will not be reviewed by a court. 107 In its or
dinary sense it serves as a defense for directors, who are thereby
shielded from liability for honest mistakes of judgment. 108 The
rule is traditionally justified on several bases: the recognition by
courts of their inherent limitations in business matters and their
concomitant reluctance to substitute their judgment for that of
directors;109 the realization that directors are fallible and that
persons of ability would be reluctant to serve as directors if the
law imposed an unreasonably demanding degree of foresight;110
109

See , e.g., Veasey

& Manning,

supra note 105, at 926-930 (asserting that there is

no agreement on level of care required, and discussion of that conflict); Veasey

& Seitz,

The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act, the Trans Union Case, and the
ALI Project-A Strange Porridge, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1483, 1493 (1985) (commentators do

not agree on level of care required-ordinary negligence or gross negligence) [hereinafter
cited as Veasey & Seitz].
1...

3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 1039; HENN

& .ALEXANDER,

supra note 53, §

242, at 661. An excellent overview of this topic is found in Arsht, The Business Judg
ment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Arsht).
108

Veasey

& Seitz,

supra note 106, at 1484-85.

A technical distinction is sometimes drawn by commentators between the business
judgment rule and the business judgment doctrine. The business judgment rule is a de
fense invoked to shield directors from personal liability for damages. The same principle
of deference to directors may also be applied in a

case seeking

to enjoin board action to

uphold the decision itself. The latter is sometimes referred to as "transactional justifica
tion." Thus, the rule protects the decision maker, while the doctrine protects the deci
sion. See, e.g., Hinsey, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate
Gouernance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.

609, 611-12, 6 1 8 ( 1 984) [hereinafter cited as Hinsey]; Veasey

& Seitz,

supra note 106, at

1487-88. This terminology is not, however, commonly employed by courts, and this arti
cle will use the term "business judgment rule" as subsuming both aspects.
'" See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y. 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419

N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 ( 1979) (doctrine bars judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors
in good faith and honest judgment in legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes); Hin
sey, supra note 108, at 612 (same); Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A Cri
tique of Part IV, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 653, 664 (1984).
110
See Arsht, supra note 107, at 95-97. A related concern is that imposing liability
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and the fact that many business decisions involve an inherent
element of risk-taking.111 The rule, however, is not unlimited.
Directors may lose its benefit if they have a personal interest in
the challenged transaction,112 fail to exercise due care,113 abu�e
their discretion, 11• or act in bad faith.116 By the same token, m
theory the business judgment rule need not be invoked at all
unless a director cannot establish compliance with the standard
of conduct prescribed by the duty of care.116
The Model Act first codified the duty of care of directors in
1974 by amending section 35; that amendment also incorporated

com
on directors may in many instances visit them with a crushing financial burden
CoRPO
LTON,
pletely out of proportion to any possible degree of culpability. See R. HAMI
proportion to
RATIONS 705 (2d ed. 1981 ) (discussing financial burden of directors in
culpability).
111
See Arsht, supra note 107, at 100.
1 11
Id. et 115-18.
111
Id. at 118-21; see Hinsey, supra note 108, at 615 (business judgment rule not
applicable where director has made no actual decision). Thus it is commonly said that
the business judgment rule has no application where directors have failed to act or to
make en informed decision. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del.
1984)(business judgment rule has no relevance to corporate decisionmaking until after
decision has been made); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1944)(court.8 do not interfere with business judgment so long as reasonable diligence has
been exercised); Arsht, supra note 107, at 1 19-20.
1 14
Arsht, supra note 107, at 121-27.
11•
Id. at 127-30. See generally 3A W. FLECTHER, supra note 53, § 1040 (exemption
of corporate officers from liability for mistakes and judgment errors only applies where
there is exercise of skill, diligence, and care).
1 1• E .
.g , Section 8.30(d) of the RMA provides that " [a) director is not liable for any
action taken as a director, or any failure to take any action, if he performed the duties of
his office in compliance with this section." The comments elaborate on this point:
Thus, both former section 35 and current section 8.30(d) are self-executing,
and the individual director's exoneration from liability is automatic. If compli
ance with the standard of conduct set forth in former section 35 or section 8.30
is established, there is no need to consider possible application of the business
judgment rule. The possible application of the business judgment rule need
only be considered if compliance with the standard of conduct set forth in for
mer section 35 or section 8.30 is not established.
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. Ac-r. § 8. 30(d) official comment, at 224 (1984).
The point to emphasize, then, is that the duty of care and business judgment rule
are not the same. Courts often lack precision, however, in their discussions of these con
000
cepts an those of self-dealing. See, e.g., Home Tel. Co. v. Darley, 355 F. Supp. 992, 1
t
(N.D . Mi� . �973) (alt ough �fficer not liable for honest errors or mistakes of judgmen
to
when acting i n good faith, this does not excuse mistakes where loss is result of failure
exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence), aff'd per curiam, 489 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir.

�

�

1974), discussed supra note 101.
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a general statutory right of reliance on information furnished by
specified sources.111 That provision was adopted in substance
(but with some reorganization) by Section 8.30 of the RMA, the
full text of which is as follows:
(a)

A director shall discharge his duties as a director, includ

ing his duties as a member of a committee:
( 1 ) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like po
sition would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation.

(b)

1 17

In discharging his duties a director is entitled to rely on
information, opinions, reports, or statements, including fi
nancial statements and other financial data, if prepared or
presented by:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation
whom the director reasonably believes to be reliable

See Report of Committee on Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business

Corporation Act,
is as follows:

30 Bus. LAW. 501 (1975). The text of the relevant portion of section 35

A director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of any committee of the board upon which he may serve, in good
faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation, and with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like posi
tion would use under similar circumstances. In performing his duties, a direc
tor shall be entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports or statements,
including financial statements and other financial data, in each case prepared
or presented by:
(a)

one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the dir
ector reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the mat
ters presented,

(b)

counsel, public accountants or other persons as to matters which the
director reasonably believes to be within such person's professional
or expert competence, or

(c)

a committee of the board upon which he does not serve, duly desig
nated in accordance with a provision of the articles of incorporation
or the bylaws, as to matters within its designated authority, which
committee the director reasonably believes to merit confidence,

but he shall not be considered to be acting in good faith if he has knowledge
concerning the matter in question that would
unwarranted.

cause

such reliance to be

MODEL BustNESS CoRP. Acr § 35 (1974). For a useful, practical interpretation of the
35, see Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAw. 1591, 1600
( 1978).

meaning of section
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(2)

(3)

(c)
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and competent in the matters presented;
pers?n � as to
legal counsel, public accountants, or other
w1thm the
matters the director reasonably believes are
o
person's professional or expert competence; �
.
� ch he is
wh
a committee of the board of directors of
es the
not a member if the director reasonably believ
committee merits confiden ce.

A director is not acting in good faith if he has
knowledge concerning the matter in question that
makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsec tion
(b) unwarranted.

(d)

A director is not liable for any action taken as a di
rector, or any failure to take any action, if he per
formed the duties of his office in compliance w ith
this section. 118

While at least thirty-two states have now codified the duty
of care,11 • there is no direct analogue to Section 8.30 in the
MBCA. Section 91 of the MBCA imposes a statutory liability on
directors who vote for or assent to improper dividends, share re
purchases, distributions in liquidation, loans to insiders, or the
commencement of business before the receipt of the minimum

1 11

REVISED MODEL Busnass CoRP. AcT § 8.30 ( 1984).

'" Au. CoDE 10-2A-74 (1980); CAL. CoRP. CooE § 309(a))(W est 1 97 7 ) ; CoLO. REV.

;
STAT. § 7-5-101(2)(Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33 -313(d))(Wes t Supp . 1986}
RE
V
WAI
ANN.
§ 607 .111(4)) (West 1977); GA. CooE ANN. §§ 14 - 2- 152 (1982); HA
Fu. STAT.
I
.
35
STAT. § 416-91.5(c)(Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-35 (1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 23- 1 - ·
N.
1 (Bums Supp. 19 86) ; low A CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (West Supp. 1986); L A. REV. STAT. AN
NS
ss'
§ 12.91 (West 1969); ME. REv. STAT ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (1981); Mo. CoRP. & A
6);
Coor: ANN. § 2.405.l(a)(3))(1985); MASS. ANN. LAW S ch. 156B, § 65 (West Supp. 198
1985
st
MICH. COMP LAWS ANN. § 450.1541 (1))(1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (We
};
AT.
M oN'I'. CoDE ANN. § 35-1-401(2))(1985); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2035 (1983); N.H. REV. ST
ANN. § 293-A : 35 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT./ ANN. § 14A:6-14 (West 1969); N.Y. Bu s. CoRP.
§
LAW § 717 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982); OHio REV. C onE A NN.
8
22
1701.59 (Page 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.34 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.
S.C.
(1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon 1967); RI. GEN. LAWS § 7 - 1 . 1 -33 ( 1 985 ) ;
Co
CooE ANN. § 33-13-150 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CooE ANN. § 48 -1-813 ( 1 984); V A.
DE
6)
198
.
p
;
ANN. § 13. 1 -690 ( Rep l. Vol. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.343 (Sup
Wvo. STAT. § 17 - l - 133(b) (Supp. 1985). The new T ennessee Business Corporatio n Act ,
.
_
effective O ctober 1, 1987 , adopts section 8.30 of the RMA without change . 1986 Tenn
Pub. Acta ch. 887, § § 8.30, 17.08.
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capital . 1 20 Also, it includes a limited right of reliance for the pur
pose of determining liability under the section. 1 2 1 The MBCA
does not otherwise speak to the issue of a standard of conduct
for directors. The salient question, then, is whether it should.
Few, if any, issues in the field of corporate law have been
subject to more extensive recent debate than the appropriate
standard of c onduct for directors. In addition to the develop
ment of the Model Act and RMA standards, the American Law
Institute 's Principles of Corporate Governance Proj ect has dealt
intensively with the issue, 1 22 a s has an immense body of schol
arly literature . 1 23 Any attempt at an in-depth analysis of the is-

1 1•
12 1

Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-3-91 (1972).

Specifically, a director may rely upon:

[F] inancial statements of the corporation represented to him to be correct by
the president or the officer of such corporation having charge of its books of
account, or stated in a written report by an independent public or certified
public accountant or firm of such accountants fairly to reflect the financial con
dition of such corporation . . . .
Id. He is likewise shielded from liability if "in good faith in determining the amount

available for any such dividend or distribution he considered the assets to be of their
book value." Id.
1 22

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent.

Draft No. 4, 1 985) [hereinafter cited as Tent. Draft No. 4] .
m

See , e.g., Andrews, Corporate Governance Eludes the Legal Mind, 37 U. MIAMI

L. REv. 213 ( 1983); Arsht, supra note 107; Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard-Same
Harbor but Charted Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAW. 947 (1980); Brudney, The Role
of the Board of Directors: The ALI and Its Critics, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 223 (1983);

Christy, Corporate Mismanagement as Malpractice: A Critical Reanalysis of Corporate
Managers ' Duties of Care and Loyalty, 2 1 Hous. L. REv. 105 (1984); Coffee, Regulating
the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
Corpora te Governance, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 145 (1984) [hereinafter cited

as

Coffee];

Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Stands and Sane·
tions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEx. L. REV. 591 ( 1 983); Dent, The
Revolu tion in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the Director's Duty of
Care, 61 B.U.L. REV. 623 (1981); Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An
Essay for Bill Cary, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 187 ( 1 983); Fischel, The Corporate Governance
Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259 (1982); Frankel, Corporate Directors' Duty of Care:
The American Law Institute's Project on Corporate Governance, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
705 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Frankel]; Goldstein, Future Articulation of Corporate
Law, 39 Bus. LAW. 1541 (1984); Hinsey, supra note 108; Kennedy, The Standard of Re
sponsibility for Directors, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 624 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Ken·
nedy]; Knauss, Corporate Governance - A Mouing Target, 79 MICH. L. REV. 478 (1981);
Letts, Corporate Governance: A Different Slant, 35 Bus. LAW. 1505 ( 1980); Mace, Direc·
tors: Myth and Reality - Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 293 (1979); Mangrum, In
Search of a Paradigm of Corporate Social Responsibility, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 21

[VOL. 56
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sue is beyond the scope of this article. Some general observa
tions, however, should be made.
Foremost among these is that there is obviously no consen
sus whatsoever as to the appropriate standard of care, whether
existing formulations are too lax or too demanding, or indeed
whether it is feasible to codify the duty of care at all. Even the
drafters of the RMA have been inconsistent in their approach;
the original version of section 8.30 attempted not only to state
12'
the duty of care but also to codify the business judgment rule.

( 1983-84); Manning, The Business Judgement Rule and the Director's Duty of Atten·
tion: Time for Reality, 39 Bu s. LAW. 1477 ( 1984); Manning, The Business Judgment
Rule in Overview, 145 OHIO ST. L.J. 615 (1984); Phillips, Principles of Corporate Govern·
ance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653 (1984); Ruder, Protections for
Corporate Shareholders: Are Major Revisions Needed?, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 243 ( 1983);
Scott,

Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project,

35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983); Steinberg, The American Law lnstitute's Draft Restate·

ment on Corporate Governance: The Business Judgment Rule, Related Principles, and
Some General Observations, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 295 ( 1983); Veasey, New Insights into
Judicial Deference to Di,.ectors' Business Decisions: Should We Trust the Courts?, 39
Bus. LAW. 1461 (1984); Veasey & Manning, supra note 105; Williamson, Corporate Gov·
ernance, 93 YALE L.J. 105 (1984).
, .. 1983 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.30 (Exposure Draft March, 1983) .
The 1983 Draft provides:
(a)

A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee:

(1)

in good faith;

(2)

with the care an ordinarily prudent p erson in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances; and

(3)

When exercising his business judgment, with the belief, premised on
a rational basis, that his decision is in the best interests of the
corporation.

(b)

In d iacharging his duties a director is entitled to rely on information,
. .
opinions, reports or statements, includi n g financial statements and other
financial data, if prepared or presented by:

(1)

one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the direc
tor reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters
presented;

(2)

�

l gal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters the
d irector reasonably believes are within the person's professional or
expert competence; or

(3)

(c)

a committee of the board of which he is not a member as to matters
within its jurisdiction, if the director reasonably beli ves the com
mittee merits confidence.

�

�

A direc or is not acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the
.
matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection
(b) unwarranted.
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This latter effort was abandoned in the final version of section

8.30. 1211

(d)

(e)

Subject to compliance with section 8.31 if a director has an interest in a
transaction:
( l ) the director is not liable for the performance of the duties of his
office if he acted in compliance with this section; and
a person alleging a violation of this section has the burden of prov
(2)
ing the violation.
Subject to compliance with other provisions of this Act and other applica
ble law, a proceeding to enjoin, modify, rescind, or reverse a business deci
sion, based on an alleged violation of this section, may not prevail if the
directors who made the decision discharged their duties in compliance
with this section.

Id.

1 11

The explanation for the change is that extensive adverse comments were received
to the proposed section; in light of these, the drafters concluded that the issues involved
were too complex to resolve at that time and returned to the more trad itional formula
tion finally adopted. See 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 933 (3d ed. 1 985); Goldstein,
supra note 8, at 1475.
This criticism has not deterred the American Law Institute; Section 4.01 of the pro
posed Principles of Corporate Governance embraces both concepts:
(a) A director or officer has a duty to his corporation to perform his functions
in good faith, in a manner that he reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent
person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and
under similar circumstances.
(1)
This duty includes the obligation to make, or cause to b e made, such
inquiry as the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropri
ate under the circumstances.
(2)
In performing any of his functions (including his oversight func
tions), a director or officer is entitled to rely on materials and per
sons in accordance with § § 4.02-.03.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute or by a standard of the corpora
tion and subject to the board's ultimate responsibility for oversight, in
performing its functions (including oversight functions), the board may
delegate, formally or informally by course of conduct, any function (in"
eluding the function of identifying matters requiring the attention of the
board) to committees of the board or to directors, officers, employees, ex
perts, o r other persons; a director may rely on such committees and per
sons in fulfilling his duty under this Section with respect to any delegated
function if his reliance is in accordance with §§ 4.02-.03.
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills
his duty under this Section if:
(1) he is not interested in the subject of his business judgment;
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business judgment
to the extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate under the cir :
cumstances; and

(3)

he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best inter-

[VOL .
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criticized on
The Model Act (and RMA) standard has been
of the "reasona
various grounds. Some argue that the inclusion
standard of
ble belief ' test may tend to undercut the good faith
judic ial re
the business judgment rule and expand the scope of
ct to at
view of decisions which would otherwise not be subje
les , it is
tack. 1 26 Others suggest that, due to its different variab
ly, in
difficult to construct, apply, and understand . 1 27 Interesting
Virginia
drafting the new Virginia Stock Corporation Act, the
hold
Code Commission concluded that RMA Section 8.30 could
how 
directors to an unrealistically high standard. 1 28 Virginia,
good
ever, apparently has adopted a standard that requires only
e
faith, thereby foreclosing any inquiry into a director 's comp
tence.129 Certainly the high cost and, indeed, increasing unavail
ability of directors' and officers' insurance has created very legit

imate concerns on the part of corporate management as to its
potential liability. The Virginia Legislature was, no doubt, moti-

ests of the corporation.
Tent. Draft No. 4, supra note 122, § 4.01. So long as a business decision is made on an
informed basis, then, it is reviewed not against the "reasonable man" standard generally
applicable but against the more lenient business judgment rule. Murphy, The New Vir
ginia Stock Corporation Act: A Primer, 20 U RICH L. REV. 67, 106 n.1 1 1 (1985) [herein
.
.
after cited as Murphy]. Extensive commentary on the ALI standard can b e found in
Frankel, supra note 123; Hinsey, supra note 108; Kennedy, supra note 123; Phillips ,
supra note 123.
,.. See, e.g., Veasey & Manning, supra note 105 at 930-42.
'
m
M urphy, supra note 125, at 105-06. The author suggests the followi ng methodology for applying the Model Act test:
Application of this standard requires the trier of fact first to construct a
factual background including the time and information constr aints, the
ma �up of th
�d and .its role in corporate decision making (the "in like
,,
position and , m similar circumstances" elements). Next, what the ordinarily
prudent perso�, as easured against that factual backgrou
�
nd, would do with
respect t? th� issue m question must be determined.
Finally, the trier of fact
must decide 1f the conduct or act'ion of the duectors
'
m question was consistent
.
with the reasonable man standard.
Id. at 105.

�

� _ho

•

.

·

·

·

ltl v A. CODE COMM' N, REPORT ON THE REVISION O
l
F CHAPTERS 1 AND 2 OF TITLE 13.
or THE C oDE or VIRGINIA, H. Doc. No. 13, app. 4, at 24s
(1985).
'" As enac
d , th new Virginia statute require
�
s a director to act "in accordance
. his
. good faith business judgm
with
ent of the best intere sts of the corporat'ion. " VA . CoDE
. .
.
ANN § 13.l -690(A)(re l vol 1985). By ehmmatm
g any semblance of a reasonable man
P
.
.
v
1rgm1a Act may reduce the d t
standar
. d , the
u Y of care to a purely subjective mqmry
,
.
.
"
mto th� director 8 good fait . In so doing the statute
may invite protection for the
utterl y mept, but well-meanmg, good faith director
. " Murphy, supra no te 1 2 5, a t 108

�

·

·

·

·

�

·

·

·

·
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vated in part by those concerns in its actions. On the other
hand, it is dis ingenuous to ignore the revenue-enhan cing poten
tial of provisions which, understandably, are appealing to corpo
rate managers and promoters. 1 3 0 While certainly any corporate
legislation enacted in Mississippi should create as favorable a
climate for business as reasonably practicable, one must balance
against this the possible prejudice to shareholders from the
adoption o f an overly lax standard.
The burgeoning case law involving hostile takeover bids and
the permissible range of conduct by mangement in r esponding to
them has brought into focus issues involving the duty of care
and the business judgment rule with an intensity never before
expierenced in American corporate law. 131 Moreover, suggestions

"0

The Virginia Act contains other models on this point. In addition to possibly

eliminating a meani ngful duty of care, it includes a separate set of provisions dealing
with "affiliated transactions" between a corporation and a pote ntia lly dominant share
holder.

See VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 1 3 . 1 -725 to -728 (repl. vol. 1985). The clear thrust of these

provisions is to discourage hostile takeover attempts, although the statute is admittedly
more broadly drawn.
sions

dealing

shareholders).
131

with

See Murphy, supra not e 1 25, at 124-27 (general discussion of provi
transactions

between

corporations

and

potentially dominant

See, e.g. , Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.

1986); Norlin Co rp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F . 2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Gearhart Indus. v.
Smith Int'!, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717
F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983); Mobile Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981);
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 2 7 1 (7th Cir. 1981),

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092

(1981); Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co.
v. Inter North Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); Minstar Acquiring C orp.

v.

AMF, Inc.,

621 F. Supp 1 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Ben dix Corp. , 549 F. Supp.
.

623 (D. Md. 1982); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986); Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus. , 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 490 A.2d
1059 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1 985); Veasey & Seitz, supra note 106, at 148993. For bac k grou nd on the various defense mechanisms utilized to combat hostile take
overs see A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING (1981); M.
LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVE RS AND FREEZEOUTS (1978); B lac k & Sm ith Antitake
,

over Charter Provisions: Defending Self-Help for Takeover Targets, 36 WASH. & LEB L.
REv. 699 ( 1979) ; Friedenberg, Jaws III: The Impropriety of Shark-Repellant Amend·
ments as a Takeover Defense, 7 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 32 (1982); Gils on , A Structural Ap·
proach to Corporations: The Case Against Defense Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 819 ( 1981 ) ; Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the Williams Act's
Prohibition Against Manipulation, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1982); Commen t Delaware's
Attempt to Swallow a New Takeover Defense: The Poison Pill Preferred Stock, 10 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 569 ( 1 985); Note, Target Defensive Tactics as Manipulative under Section
14(e) , 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 228 (1984); Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and
,
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that the protections of the business judgment rule have limited

the duty of care to an aspirational function, 1 32 or that the duty
.
v.
of care is "dead,"133 have been largely put to rest by Smith

Van Gorkom1a. (the "Trans Unio n " case), in which the Dela

ware Supreme Court held that the board of directors o f Tr ns
�
Union Corporation was guilty of "gross negligence" in evaluatmg
and recommending to the shareholders for approval a merger
proposal.1311 The court imposed liability on them for the diffe� 
ence between the price paid by the purchaser and the "fair
value" of the corporation's stock as of the date of the merger.1 36

Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964 ( 1984 ) ; Note,
Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 62l

(1983).

111
m
m
m
1"

See Hinsey, supra note 108, at 614-15.

See Frankel, supra note 123, at 715-16.

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) .
Id. at 881.
Id. at 893. It is difficult to impart the full flavor of Van Gorkom without a de

tailed reading of the rather lengthy opinion. Essentially, Van Gorkom, Trans Union's

chairman, formulated a plan to sell the corporation for $55 a share in a leveraged buy
out and presented the plan to industrialist Jay Pritzker of Chicago. Although the corpo

ration's chief financial officer had suggested that a feasible r ange for such a transaction

$50 to $60 per share, no extensive study on that question was undertaken; rather
Van Gorkom seized upon the $55 figure as a price for which he would b e will ing to sell
his 75,000 shares. Immediately before the merger was announced, the stock was selling at

was

a high of $38.25 and a low of $29.50. The negotiations between Van Gorkom and Pritzker
k
were private and not specifically authorized by the board; no price negotiations too
place. When Pritzker presented a merger offer with a three day deadline, Van Gorkom

called a board meeting for the next day; the notice did not disclose the purpose of the
meeting. At the meeting, Van Gorkom made a twenty minute presentation concerning

the proposal; he did not disclose the methodology by which he had arrived at the $55
price or that he proposed that price to Pritzker. The only other matters of substance
presented to the board were ( 1 ) its attorney's advice that a fairness opinion was not
required as a matter of law; (2) the chief financial officer's statement that $55 was in the
ran e of a f� ir price; and (3) a supporting statement by the corporation's president. The
�
entire meetmg lasted abut two hours; the result was board approval of the merger agree
ment, which at that time (and indeed as of its execution) had not been read by any
member of the board, including Van Gorkom. Id. at 866-69.
The court held that the directors (five inside and five outside) breached their "fidu

ciary duty" to shareholders by "their failure to inform themselves of all information rea
sonably available to them and relevant to their decision to recommen
d the Pritzker
e
merger," thus denying them the protection of the business judgment rule. Id. at
893 . Th
case was thereafter settled for $23,500,000. R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 679 (3d ed.

1986).

P re i tably, Van Gor� om has attracted a firestorm
of controversy and commentary
�
( both critical and supportive) . See , e.g., Chittur, su
pra note 105 ; Fischel, The Bu siness

�

1986)

CORPORA TE LA W REFORM

Clearly, then, this is an area of the law currently

201
m

a state of

substantial ferment.
The fa ct that corporate law nationally is in a period of rapid
change on these issues, coupled with the paucity of authority in
Mississippi, leads to the conclusion that codification of the duty
of care m a y be premature in this state. This is based on two

Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437, 1455 ( 1 985) (describing
Van Gorkom as "one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law") [hereinafter
cited as Fischel, Tra ns Union) ; Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the
Boardroom after Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985); Moskin, Trans Union: A Nailed
Board, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405 ( 1985); Prickett, An Explanation of Trans Union to
"Henny Penny " and Her Friends, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451 (1985); Quillen, Trans Union,
Business Judgment and Neutral Principles, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465 (1985); Schwartz &
Wiles, Trans Union: Neither "Ne w " nor "Ba d " Law, 10 DEL. J. C ORP. L. 429 (1985);
Veasey & Seitz, s upra note 106, at 1497-1503; Comment, Mining the Safe Harbor? The
Business Judgment Rule After Trans Union, 10 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 545 ( 1985); Baldo, Dela·
ware Rocks the Boat, FORBES, April 8, 1985, at 126; Bordon, First Thoughts on Decision
in Delaware on Trans Union, N.Y.L.J. Feb. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 3. The ultimate impact of
the decision is, of course, unclear. Some see it as part of a continuing attempt by the
Delaware Supreme Court to respond to those who criticize Delaware's corporate statutes
as inadequately protecting the rights of shareholders, particularly those in the minority.
See, e.g. , Fischel, Trans Union, supra , at 1 454; Fischel, Reflections, supra note 14, at 923
(in recent decisions Delaware Supreme Court has limited discretion of managers and
controlling sharehlders while increasing power of minority shareholders); see also supra
note 14 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of "liberal" statutes). On the other
hand, the Delaware court has certainly proven itself to be capable of mercurial conduct
in this regard. E.g., compare Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977)(hold
ing that controlling shareholders in "freezeout" merger must show legitimate business
interest for merger other than sole purpose of eliminating minority shareholders) with
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983)(overruled business purpose
test, substituted "intrinsic fairness" test and expanded appraisal valuation; thus absent
egregious misconduct on part of controlling shareholders, minority's only remedy is ap
praisal); see Berger & Allingham, A New Light on Cash-Out Mergers: Weinberger
Eclipses Singer, 3 9 Bus. LAW. 1 (1983); Note, Freezeouts Under the 1983 Illinois Busi·
ness Corporation Act: The Need for Protection of Minority Shareholders from "Going
Private" Mergers, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 679, 688-693 (1985). In any event, Trans Union

demonstrates that the duty of care is not rendered an empty threat by the shield of the
business judgment rule.
For another well-known (although arguably less dramatic) recent case imposing sub
stantial liability for director misconduct see Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15,
432 A.2d 814 ( 1981), holding the estate of the widow of a reinsurance corporation's prin·
cipal owner liable for over $10,000,000 in funds which her two sons, the other directors of
the corporation, siphoned off in the form of bogus loans. Id. at 825-26. The court im·
posed liability on the basis of her negligence in failing entirely to undertake any effort
whatsoever to acquaint herself with the affairs of the corporation. Id. Of course, because
of her total lack of any action, the business judgment rule had no application to the
claim. See supra note 113.
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premises: first, that codification is not inherently superior to
common law determinations of these issues; and second, that
any statute adopted dealing with such currently controver�ial
questions may not be determinative in the way courts decide
cases.137 The risk that a standard either unreasonably high or
undesirably lax might be enacted may be too great until the pre
sent flux in decisional law is resolved.
Significantly, Illinois, which revised its business corporation
act in 1983, incorporated much of the Exposure Draft of the
RMA but deleted section 8.30 or any other codification of the
duty of care.138 It is recommended that Mississippi do likewise,
with one exception. The express reliance provisions of Section
8.30 of the RMA139 are reasonable and provide a desirable safe
harbor for directors acting in good faith. It is suggested, how
ever, that no other attempt to define the appropriate standard
of conduct for directors should be made at this time. This ap 
proch would be consistent with that of Delaware, which provides
for a right of reliance but which otherwise does not codify the
duty of care.140
2. Duty of Loyalty.
Directors, as fiduciaries, owe a duty of undivided loyalty
and utmost good faith to their corporations. 1• 1 Broadly read , this

"' See

V�asey & S�itz, supra note 106, at 1505. For example, a court may in effect

exonerate a duector acting in good faith regardless of the language of a statute.
§§
u• See generally ILLINOIS BUSINESS CORP. AC
T OF 1983, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32 ,
l .O l - l 7 .05 (Supp. 1983). Interestingly, Illinois adopted without substantial amend m ent
the Exposure Draft provision on conflicts of interest. Compare id. § 8.60 with REVISED
Mo.DEL Bu�.INEss.CoRP. Aci: § .31 (Exposure Draft March, 1983)(comparison of " conflict
�
of 1 terest sectJO s of Ilhno1s Business Corporation Act of 1983 and Revised Model
�
�
Business Corporation Act).
... REVISED MODEL BUSINESs c ORP.
m paAc-r § 8.30(b), (c)(198
·
4); see supra text acco
.
nying note 1 1 7 .

h
uoblSee DEL.
oE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141( e)(l983).
Should a codified standard prove bot
b
e and feas1 le m light of subsequent d
e
b
rse,
cou
evelopments , such action can' of
.
tak en at th at time.
.. , 3 W. FLETCHER . supra note 53
, § 850 ; HENN & .ALEXANDER• supra note 53, § 236 '
.
1 .
·
at 628 . A cIass1c statement of the prmcip
e is found m Meinhard v. Salmon , 249 N.y·
. .
·
458, 1 64 N.E. 545 ( 1928) (0 ptmo
n bY Cardozo J ) ·
Man y forms of conduct permis ' bl .
e m a' workaday
· ·
world for those acting at
arm's length are fo b'dd en o t ose b
ound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held
to somethin stric
han t e morals of the marke
t place. Not honesty alone ,
but the punctilio of n honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behav.

des1ra

�

�

:
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duty restricts directors from competing with their corpora
tions; 14 2 a more particularized application is the avoidance of
transactions that involve conflicts of interest. 1 4 3
common law rule of automatic voidability of such
transactions has long since been abandoned by most courts. 144
The

The modern approach by courts has been to emphasize the ele
ments of fairness and disclosure; in many instances, ratification
by a disinterested board of directors has the effect of shifting
the burden of proving lack of fairness to the p arty challenging
the transaction. 1411 Nonetheless, lack of uniformity on the part of
courts considering the issue has been the rule. 148

Due in part to the lack of certainty engendered by the juris
prudence on the subject, the recent trend has been to enact stat
utory provisions dealing with conflicts of interest. The first state
to do so was California; the Model Act added a similar provision

ior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when peti
tioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating ero
sion" of particular exceptions.

Id. at 463-64, 164 N.E. at 546.
• •• HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 236, at 628. The Mississippi Constitution
and MBCA reflect this prohibition by requiring stockholder consent for a person who is
"engaged or interested in a competing business either individually or as employee or
stockholder" to be elected to the board of directors. Miss. CONST. art. 7, § 194; Miss.
CoDE ANN. § 79-3-67 (1972). As a practical matter, of course, this mandates disclosure
and express stockholder approval. This is contrary to the common law rule, at least in
the absence of detriment to the corporation. 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 856.
1 0 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 913; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 238.
1 ••

See , e.g., 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 917; Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?
Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 39 ( 1966) [hereinafter
cited as Marsh).
m See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 238, at 638-40; Marsh, supra note 144;
Hodge & Perry, supra note 2 at 388-89.
ue E.g., courts have differed on the following issues; (1) whether the interested di
rector can be counted in determining the presence of a quorum of the board; (2) whether
the vote of an interested director could be counted; and (3) whether a conflict of interest
transaction was voidable on the basis of the conflict alone, on the basis of the conflict
plus an element of bad faith or fraud, or on the basis of the conflict plus a showing of
unfairness to the corporation. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 238, at 639-40. Most
courts appear to concede that ratification by shareholders will validate the transaction,
in the absence of fraud or unfairness; again, however, there is conflicting authority as to
whether the vote of the interested director as a shareholder can be counted, although the
majority answer seems to be affirmative. Marsh, supra note 143, at 48-49 & nn.50-51.
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in 1966.1·" Currently at least thirty-eight states have adopted
such statutes. 1 " 8
The RMA carries forward the approach taken by former
Model Act Section 41. Section 8.31 of the RMA provides in per
tinent part:
(a)

A conflict of interest transaction is a transactio n with

the corporation in which a director of the corporation has a
direct or indirect interest. A conflict of interest transaction is
not voidable by the corporation solely because of the director's
interest in the transaction if any one of the following is true:

(1)

The material facts of the transaction and the direc

tor's interest were disclosed or known to the board of direc
tors or a committee of the board of d irectors and the board
of directors or committee authorized, approved, or ratified
the transaction;

(2)

the material facts of the transaction and the director's

interest were disclosed or known to the shareholders enti
tled to vote and they authorized, approved, or ratified the

' " HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 238, at 640 n.10.
••• See AL A. CooE § 10-2A-63 (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-041 (1977); CAL.
CollP. CooE § 310 (WEST 1977); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-5-1 14.5 (Supp. 1985); CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN § 33-323 ( West Supp. 1986); DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 ( 1983); FLA. STATB
ANN. § 607 . 1 24 (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-155 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-41
(1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, , 8.60 (1985); IND. STAT. ANN. § 23-1 -35-2 (Supp. 1986);
lowA CODE ANN . § 496A.34 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6304 ( 1 981); Kv.
Rzv . STAT. ANN. § 271 A.205 ( Baldwin 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.84 (West 1969); MB.
Rn STAT. ANN . tit. 1 3 -A, § 717 (1981); Mo. CORPS & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 2-419 (1985);
M1cH. CowP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1 545 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 (West
1985); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 351 .327 (Vernon Su pp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35 - 1 - 413
0985); Nu Rav . STAT. § 21-2040.01 (1983); NEv . REv. STAT. § 78.140 (1985); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 293-A:41 (Supp . 1985); N.J. STAT. A N N. § 14A:6-8 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y.
Bus. CollP. LAW, § 7 1 3 (McK inney 1986); N . C. GEN. STAT., § 55-30 (1982); OHIO R.Ev. CODE
ANN. § 1701.60 (Page 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1 . 175a (West 1986); OR. RBv.
STAT. § 57.265 ( 1 984); P A. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 14 09 . 1 (Purdon Supp. 1986); RI. GEN.
LAWS § 7-1 1-37.l ( 1 985); S .C. CODE ANN. § 33-13- 160 (Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §
48 ·1-816 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 1 , § 1888 ( 1 984); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691 (repl. vol.
1985); W. V A . CooE § 31-1 -25 (1 982); Wis. STAT. A N N. § 180.355 (West Supp. 1985); Wvo.
SnT § 17- 1 - 1 36.1 (Supp. 1985).
The Indiana and Virginia statutes cited above and the new Tennessee Business Cor

1987, have adopted section 8.31 without substantial change. See
1986 Tenn. Pub. Acta 887, § 8.31. For a discussion of the different approaches taken by
variou1 •tatea aee 2 REVISED MooEL BUSINESS CORP. A<::r. ANN. 968-70 (3d ed. 1985);
Note, Di rtC't o r Conflict of Interest under the 1983 B.C.A.; A Standard of Fairness, 1985
U ILL L Ra:v. 74 1 , 743 n . 1 2 (198!>) (hereinafter cited as Note, Fairness] .

poration Act, effective
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transaction; or
(3) the transaction was fair to the corporation. 1411
Presumably few corporate practitioners in Mississippi would
question the desirability of a statutory standard in this state.
The confusion engendered by the leading Mississippi case, Knox

Underwood, 150 has received extensive com
ment previously in this Journaz,m and those discussions need
Glass Bottle Co.

v.

not be repeated at length here. Suffice it to say that the opinion
raises several troublesome questions: e.g. , whether ratification by
disinterested directors is essentially irrelevant to the issue of the
voidability

vel non of a conflict of interest transaction;1112

whether the mere fact that an interested director represents

,., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.3l(a)(l984). The text of former section
41 is as follows:
No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of
its directors or any other corporation, firm, association or entity in which one
or more of its directors are directors or officers or are financially interested,
shall be either void or voidable because of such relationship or interest or be·
cause such director or directors are present at the meeting of the board of
directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies such
contract or transaction or because his or their votes are counted for such pur
pose, if:

(a) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the
board of directors or committee which authorizes, approves or ratifies the con·
tract or transaction by a vote o r consent sufficient for the purpose without
counting the votes or consents of such interested directors; or
(b) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known tQ the
shareholders entitled to vote and they authorize, approve or ratify such con
tract or transaction by vote or written consent; or
(c) the contract or· transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation.
Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the pres·
ence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof
which authorizes, approves or ratifies such contract or transaction.
MODEL BUSI NESS CORP Acr. § 41 (1969). It should be noted that section 41 speaks in
terms of disclosure of the "relationship or interest" of the director, while section 8.31
requires disclosure of the material facts of the transaction as well as the director's inter·
est. As to the possible significance of this distinction see infra note 156.
160
228 Miss. 699, 89 So. 2d 799 (1956), suggestion of error overruled per curiam,
228 Miss. 699, 9 1 So. 2d 843, cert . denied, 353 U.S. 977 (1957).
.

111

See generally Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 386-90 (discussion of director
confl ict o f interest); Comment, Transactions, supra note 11, at 889-95 .
... See Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 388 (discussion of Kno x Glass). But cf.
Comment, Transactions, supra note 11, at 894 (noting language in opinion that indicates
that disclosure to and approval by disinterested majority of directors would validate
transaction).
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both himself and the corporation in the transaction renders it
automatically voidable without regard to fairness;163 and
whether ratification by shareholders validates a transaction even
though it may be unfair.11H Clearly more specific dire�tion tha?
.
this is needed. It is debatable, however, whether that direction is
adequately provided by the RMA.
It has been noted that existing conflict of interest statutes
are generally narrow in scope,11111 and RMA Section 8.31 follows
this pattern. The fundamental question, however, is precisely
what it seeks to accomplish: does it state a rule by which a
transaction can be validated for all p urposes, or does it merely
save a conflict of interest transaction from automatic voidability
if the prescribed procedures are followed? Section 41 of the
Model Act, and most existing state statutes, were ambiguous on
this issue, and the RMA unfortunately carries forward this am
biguity. Arguably, the disjunctive nature of the statute suggests
that either ratification by disinterested directors or ratification
by disinterested s hareholders or a showing of fairness will vali
date a transaction. Thus, in theory, an unfair transaction might
be saved if proper ratification were effected.
The leading cases interpreting statutes similar to the Model
Act have, admittedly, rejected this construction and held that
ratification does not preclude judicial inquiry into the question
of fairness.1" This view, in turn, poses the question of what is

'" See Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 388 (discussion of Knox Glass); Comment,
Transactions, supra note 11, at 894 (comparison of Model Act with Mississippi rule in
Knox Glass). Indeed, the very sense in which the court used the term "representation" is
unclear.
, .. Comment, Transactions, supra note 1 1 , at 894.
'" They do not address the types of transactions to which they are directed; do not
refer to differing aspects of the duty of loyalty, such as competition with the corporation,
corporate o?portunitiee, or the use of corpora.tP. property, inf rmation or resources for
o
personal gain; and do not extend to officers or major shareholde
rs, or to those having
close association with directors, officers, and major shareholders. Sommer, The Duty of

Loyalty in the ALi's Corporate Gouernance Proje c t , 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 719, 722

(1984) [hereinafter cited as Sommer] .
, .. See, e.g., Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405,
241 P.2d 66, 86 0952)(held directors in violation
of fiduciary duty by entering contract
on behalf of corporation); Fliegler v. Lawren ce, 361
A.2d 218, 224-25 (Del. 197 6)(direc
to� �ust show fairness of transaction). In additio
n, most commentators have supported
thui view, althoug h there is some opinion to
the contrary. See Bulbulia & Pinto, supra
note 14, at 207 nn. 47-48 (discussion of Remilla
rd Brick). Perhaps the leading advocate
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the effect of ratification. While many courts have held that it
has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to those attacking
the transaction, others have held that it simply lowers the stan
dard o f proof of fairness or that the burden remains on the di
rector in all events. 1117 The drafters of the Model Act were some
what vague on the effect of section 41, stating only that its
purpose was "not to provide a basis for validating for all pur
poses a contract or transaction . . . but simply to establish that
such contract or transaction i s not automatically void or voida
ble solely by reason of the director's interest. "1 68 No mention
was made of burden of proof. Similarly, the comments to RMA
Section 8.31 provide only that " [t]he sole purpose of section 8.31
is to sharply limit the common law principle of automatic
voidability. "1 69 There is likewise no reference to burden of proof.
Given the significance of the question and the confusion
that continues to cloud this area under current statutes, it seems

of the latter position was Professor Ernest Folk, who argued that since the Delaware
statute requires disclosure not only of the director's interest but of the material facts of
the transaction, the purp ose of the statute was to validate the transaction if any of the
statutory tests were met. Thus, full disclosure would remove the question of fairness
from court scrutiny so long as the requirement of approval by directors or stockholders
was met. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1974); E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW
75-88 ( 1972). The effect would be to substitute full disclosure for fairness. Bulbulia &
Pinto, supra note 14, at 213. However, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected Folk's posi
tion. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 224-25 (Del. 1976). Section 8.31 of the RMA,
like Delaware but unlike Section 41 of the Model Act, requires disclosure of both the
interest and material facts of the transaction. See supra note 149 and accompanying
text.
117

See Comment, Transactions, supra note 11, at 888 nn. 65-69 (discussion of bur
den of proof of interested directors).
11•
1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 41, at 844 (2d ed. 1971). This avowal was
somewhat undercut, however, by another statem.ent that the section "validates, if the
prescribed tests are satisfied, transactions with interested directors which common law
rules often make voidable, if not void." Id. at 842 (emphasis added).
m REVISED MODEL Bus1NESs CORP. AC'f § 8.31 official comment (1984). The com ments are somewhat more detailed on the question of validation, stating that:
[T)he elimination of the automatic rule of voidability does not mean that all
transactions that meet one or more of the tests set forth in section 8.3l(a) are
automatically valid. These transactions may be subject to attack on a variety
of grounds independent of section 8.31-for example, that the transaction con
stituted waste, that it was not authorized by the appropriate corporate body,
that it violated other sections of the [RMA], or that it was unenforceable
under other common law principles.
Id.
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that Mississip pi adopts
clear that any conflict of interest stat ute
ther it prov ides a pro
should state expl icitly its purpose; or, whe
is mere ly a savings
cedure for absolute validation or whether it
retains fairn ess as
provision with procedural implications that
appea r to take
the ultimate test of validity. Some recen t statutes
adva nced that
the former approach,1 80 and arguments have been
re e and be
Mississippi should do so.181 With defer ence, I disag
lieve that Mississippi should take the latter course.
that the
The Exposure Draft of the RMA made it plain
ed only
Draft was a savings provision and that ratification operat
n at
to shift the burden of proof from the director to the perso
abantacking the transaction.182 This approach was ultima tely

actions
The present California statute appears to validate for all purposes trans
CoDE §
ratified by disinterested shareholders without regard to fairness. See CAL. CoRP.
14, at
310 & legislative committee comment (West 1977); Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note
"0

218-23.
111

See Comment, Transactions, supra note

11, at 899-900 (proposed absolute vali 

dation for Mississippi).
111 R
EVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. AcT § 8.31 (Exposure Draft March, 1983):
(a) If a transaction is fair to a corporation at the time it is authorize d,
approved, or ratified, the fact that a director or officer of the corpor ation has a
direct or indirect interest in the transaction is not a ground for invalidating the
transaction or for imposing liability on that director or officer.
(b) In a proceeding contesting the validity of a transaction in which a
director or officer has an interest, the person asserting validity has the burden
of proving fairness unless:
(1) the material facts of the transaction and the director 's or of
ficer's interest were disclosed or known to the board of directors or a com 
mi�tee of the board and the board or committee authorized, approved, or
ratified �he tran�ction by the vote of a requisite quorum of directors who
had no interest m the transaction; or
(2 ) the material facts of the transaction and the director 's or of·
ficer's interest were disclosed to the shareholders entitled to vote and they
authorized, approved, or ratified the transaction by the vote of a requisite
quorum of shareholders who had no interest in the transaction .
(c) Th� presen�e of, or votes entitled to be cast by, the director or officer
who �� a d uect or indirect interest in the transaction may be counted in de
termmmg �hether a quorum is present but may not be counted when the
board 0� directors, a committee of the board, or the shareholders vote on the
transaction .
(d) For purposes of this section, a director or officer has an indirect inter.
.
. .
est m a transa
ction if an ent't
.
1 Y m wh"1ch he h as a material financial mterest or
.
.
.
m which he 1s an officer d"1rector, or
genera 1 partner 1s a party to the transaction. A vote or consent of that ent"t
1 Y 1s d eemed to be a vote or consent of the
.
director or officer for purposes of subsection (c).
·

•

.

·
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cloned, however, and the drafters of the RMA returned to a
more traditional approach. 183 Significantly, Professor Robert
Hamilton, Reporter for the RMA, has expressed his strong disa
greement with the decision of the Committee, 184 and one major
state, Illinois, has adopted the substance of the Exposure Draft
in its new business corporation act. 14111
I believe that the Illinois approach is sound and should be
followed i n Mississippi. To be sure, the attractions of a validat-

Id. Moreover, the proposed comments to the Draft stated that " Section 8.31 validates
only fair transactions and allocates the burden of proof on the issue of fairness." This
was said to " follow the judicial construction placed on earlier versions of the Model Act
dealing with the subject of self-dealing transactions." Id. official comment.
11•
The only official explanation for the change was that "adverse comments" were
received on the proposed section. 2 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 966 (3d
ed. 1985); see Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1475-76 (explaining changes in two versions).
,.. Hamilton, supra note 8, at 1455, 1463, 1468 n.35
11 8.60 ( 1 985):

m ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
11 8.60

Director conflict of interest.
(a) If a transaction is fair to a corporation at the time it is authorized,
approved, or ratified, the fact that a director of the corporation is directly or
indirectly a party to the transaction is not grounds for invalidating the
transaction.
(b) In a proceeding contesting the validity of a transaction described in
subsection (a), the person asserting validity has the burden of proving fairness
unless:
( 1 ) The material facts of the transaction and the director's interest or
relationship were disclosed or known to the board of directors o r a committee
of the board and the board or committee authorized, approved or ratified the
transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority of disinterested directors,
even though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or
(2) The material facts of the transaction and the director's interest or
relationship were disclosed or known to the shareholders entitled to vote and
they authorized, approved or ratified the transaction without counting the vote
of any shareholder who is an interested director.
The presence of the director, who is directly or indirectly a party to the
transaction described in subsection ( 1), or a director who is otherwise not dis
interested, may be counted in determining whether a quorum is present but
may not be counted when the board of directors or a committee of the board
takes action on the transaction.
For purposes of this Section, a director is "indirectly" a party to a transac
tion if the other party to the transaction is an entity in which the director has
a material financial interest or of which the director is an officer, director or
general partner.

Id. Unlike the Exposure Draft, Illinois (like most states) continues to limit its conflict of
interest rules to directors, not nondirector officers. See supra note 162. For an analysis of
the Illinois statute see Note, Fairness, supra note 148.
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ing statute (particularly to corporate counsel) are obvious: it
provides a substantial measure of predictability, and would seem
to provide a far surer basis for an opinion on the enforceability
of an interested party transaction. This, however, may be some
what illusory; even validating statutes customarily require that
ratification be made "in good faith,"166 a notoriously elusive con
cept. Fundamentally, however, the potential for abuse militates
against the adoption of a validating statute, o r even one (like the

that could conceivably be so construed.1 67 Ratifi
cation by directors, even if technically disinterested , may be

present

RMA)

tainted by their association with the interested director. Particu
larly if the interested director is a dominant member of the
board, it may be disingenuous to believe that his colleagues
could exercise independent judgment.
While shareholder ratification might, on the surface, provide
a more substantial basis for validation, this likewise may be
more apparent than real. The ease with which shareholder votes
can be manipulated in public corporations is well known to any
one with experience in that type of representation. Moreover,
the argument that any infirmity in the vote can be adequately
avoided by preventing the interested director's shares from be 
1 8
ing counted towards a quorum or in the vote is too simplistic. 6
Section 8.31 of the RMA does not deal adequately with this

problem. While the provision disquali fies the interested director
from voting, it provides that a majority of the remaining shares
constitutes a quorum for purposes of ratification, and a majority

119

See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a)(1977).

Notwithstanding the substantial authority to the contrary and the avowals in the
commentary to the RMA, the possibility of such a construction of § 8.31 should not be
discounted. For example, the new Virginia Act adopts § 8.31 without substantial change.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691 (repl. vol. 1985). The Joint Bar Committee appointed to stu Y
the draft statute stated in its commentary that while " [s]ome courts have read the fair
ness element into the disclosure and voting sections . . . [t]his section does not adopt
this approach." VA. CODE CoMM'N REPORT ON THE REVISION OF CHAPTERS 1 AND 2 or
ITLE 13.l OP THE CooE or VIRGI NIA H. Doc. No. 13, App. 4, at 251 (1985) [herein afte
cited as VA. CODE COMM,N REPORT] For an argument that the new Virginia Act does n o
depart from prevailing interpretations of prior law despite the uncertainty caused by the
traditional formulation, see Murphy, supra note 125, at 1 1 1-12.
g
, .. Se e Comment Transactio ns, supra note 11, at 899-900 (proposed preve n tin
:
.
shares of mterested duectors from being counted).
1 87

�

1'.

,

.

�
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vote of those shares will be sufficient to constitute ratification. 169
The result may be ratification by the majority of a minority of
shares.170 This hardly insulates the ratification from the influ
ence of the interested director, since a quorum could be ob
tained without his shares but composed of a majority of shares
sympathetic t o his interests.
In sum, I submit that the approach of Illinois and the RMA,
while surely not perfect,111 best accommodates management's in
terest in stability and predictability with the need to provide
protection to all shareholders, particularly those in the minority,
against overreaching by members of management. Shifting the
burden of proof upon ratification accomplished according to the
prescribed procedure should provide adequate assurance to
management that transactions for which there is no cause for
concern will be upheld.112 On balance, then, the enactment of a
saving statute with an explicit allocation of the burden of proof
best serves the interests of all of a corporation's constituent
groups. 11 s

Ill

110
171

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.31(d)(l984).

Id. official comment 2(b).

One may legitimately question what "fairness" means. Clearly it has both proce
dural and substantive connotations; various definitions have been applied. For an exten
sive discussion of this question, see Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 14, at 223-27. The
Exposure Draft stated that a transaction would in most cases be deemed fair "if it is a
transaction that might reasonably have been entered into at arms-length by disinterested
persons." REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.31 official comment (Exposure Draft
March, 1983); see also Note, Fairness, supra note 148, at 750-56 (recommending analyti
cal approach to be taken to new Illinois statute).
1
11
Of course, it would be naive to think that "grey area" questions will not arise,

and it is surely possible that a transaction approved in good faith will later be ruled
voidable upon the suit of shareholders on the basis of lack of fairness. The party primar
ily at risk in this i nstance is, however, the interested director. The business judgment
rule should p rotect the other directors who either ratified the transaction or recom·
mended its ratification to the shareholders. In the final analysis, then, such decisions
may be for the most part a question of business risk for the interested director.
178
The ALI Corporate Governance Project has taken an approach to this question
that provides a n interesting contrast to existing statutes and the RMA. For example, it
extends the duty of loyalty to senior executives and dominating shareholders as well as
directors; describes in detail the types of conduct which may involve breaches of the
duty of loyalty; provides explicit allocation of the burden of proof; and is in general
substantially more detailed than current statutes. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTI
TUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, §§ 5.015.14 (Tent. Draft No. 5, April 15, 1986). For a discussion of an earlier draft of the ALI
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Loans to Management.
quest ion of
The MBC A takes a simple approach to the
bited .11"
loans to officers and directors: they are absolutely prohi
seen as an
Historically, this was a common respo nse to what was
discussed
inherent possibility for abuse. As has been previously
imposi ng
in depth in this Journa l, legitimate r easons exist for
man
restraints on the ability of a corporation to make loans to
rec
agement.17 1 In recent years, howeve r, the trend has been to
and
,
ognize that some such loans may have a legitimate purpose
is
that an element of flexibility is desirable.176 Thus, Mississippi
now one of but four states with an explicit statutory prohibition
3.

of all managem ent loans.177 Most states now provide limited cir
cumstances under which such loans are valid,178 a position first
taken by the Model Act in 1969.179 So long as the interests of
shareholders, particularly those i n the minority, are adequately
protected, it would seem some modification of the rule of per se
invalidity under the MBCA is in order.180 Again, the question is

duty of loyalty provisions, see Sommer, supra note 155, at 726-42.
"' Miss. Comt ANN.
,,. See Hodge

&

§ 79-3-89 (1972).

Perry, supra note 2, at 390-92 (discussion of loans to officers and

directon). For other background on the subject see Mann, Moral and Ethical Problems:

Loana to Management and Compensation Problems, 31 Bus. LAW 1305 (1976); Rich,
Corporate Loana to Officers, Directors and Shareholders, 14 Bus. LAW. 658 ( 1959) .

an
"1 For example, strictly read, the MBCA could prohibit a salary advance to
employee.
"' The others are Alaska, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.213
0985); Nu. Rzv. STAT. § 21-2045 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1. 175 ( 1986).
"' 2 Rzv1s&o Moon Bus1NBSS CoRP. Acr ANN. 1018 (3d ed. 1985). Not all recen t
1tatutet, however, have followed the trend towards codification. For example, the new

Virginia Act makes no provision, thereby treating director loans the same as any self
dealing transaction. See VA. Cong Coww'N REPoaT, supra note 167, at 52.
'" Moon BUSINllSS CoRP. A<:r § 47 (1969). The 1969 Model Act prohibited loans to

dir�n unlesa authorized by the shareholders, but permitted loans to employees (in
cluding employee. who were directors) if the board of directors determined that the loan
might benefit the corporation. The comments to section 47 stated that " business purpoee

or benefit to the corporation" wu the criterion for determining the validity of employee
lo.na. 1 Moon BustNUS CoRP. A<:r ANN. § 47, 11 2, at 950-51 (2d ed. 197 1 ).
.
•• �bly, of COUlle, crediton are a second group whose interests should be con
eidered in th11 regard. See, e.g., Hodge & Perry, supra note
2, at 392 (suggesting that
manqement loans ahould be subject to same limitations
as corporate distributions in
order � p�otect creditors). For a variety of reaaons,
I do not believe that the potential
for p�e1ud1ce to creditors i1 aubttantial enough to
justify such a rule. At least insofar as
the �11hta of contract creditors are concerned , other
adequate safeguards exist. A major
crfditor could , for example, impoee contractual
limitations on manageme nt loans as a

�
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whether the RMA provision accomplishes this purpose.
Section 8.32 of the RMA permits loans to directors under
either of two circumstances. The first is that the loan is ap
proved by a majority of the outstanding shares of all classes vot
ing as a single voting group 181 with the interested director's
shares being disqualified.182 The second is that the board of di
rectors determines that the loan benefits the corporation and ap
proves either the particular loan or a general plan authorizing
loans.183
I submit that each of these provisions should be modified
before enactment in Mississippi. As to the first, one of the most
compelling reasons for restricting loans to directors is to guard
against majority oppression of minority shareholders, 18' particu
larly in closely-held corporations. Merely disqualifying the votes
of the interested director himself does not, in my view, ade
quately guard against this possibility. On the other hand, in a
public corporation (where such loans are less likely to occur on
individualized basis) no greater statutory protection is proba

an

bly needed. Thus, section 8.32 should be amended to permit a
corporation to impose a higher (even unanimous) vote require
ment in its articles or bylaws. This would permit minority share
holders in a closely-held corporation to guard against such
problems as a matter of negotiation at the time the corporation
is formed. 1 86
For similar reasons, the RMA goes too far in permitting the

condition to the extension of credit. Even in the absence of such leverage, a contract
creditor is always free to decline to extend credit if it believes that a corporation has an
excessive amount of management debt. Involuntary or tort creditors, of course, have
somewhat different standing; but neither the presence of legally available surplus (to use
the MBCA standard) nor the mere solvency of a corporation (the RMA standard for
distributions) assures an adequate fund for the satisfaction of claims.
Corporate distributions and applicable limitations thereon will be discussed in Part
2 of this article .
"' The concept of voting groups under the RMA is discussed infra at notes 289-92
and accompanying text.
' 11
REVISED MODEL Bus1NBss CoRP. ACT § 8.32(a)(l)(l984).
of a
•u Id . § 8.32(a)(2). In each instance, the RMA treats a corporate guarantee
director's indebtedness the same as a loan.
... See Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 391 (suggested majority shareholders-direc
tors could redirect corporate assets to themselves without stockholder vote).
'" Cf. id. at 392 (discussion of prejudice to minority shareholders).
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board to authorize particular loans without shareholder partici
pation. Indeed, the interested director is not even disqualified
by the statute from voting on his own loan. Thus, I would re
strict the discretion of the board acting alone to approve general
plans authorizing loans to directors (as well as officers and em
ployees), an authority which presumably would encompass such
matters as loans of petty cash, advances for expenses incurred in
furtherance of the corporation's business, and employee benefit
plans.186 Major loans made on an ad hoc basis should be ap 
proved, if at all, only by the shareholders as discussed above.
C.

Officers

Subchapter D of Chapter 8 of the RMA, dealing with corpo
rate officers, is substantively different from the MBCA in only
two respects. The first appears somewhat mundane, but repre
sents a departure from prevailing practice in most states: the
RMA does not prescribe the designation of any particular of
ficers, and likewise has no prohibition against an individual
holding any two or more offices at the same time. 1 87 The RMA
approach in this regard is distinctly a minority one. At present,
only four states have similar provisions. 1 88 Like most states,1 89
the MBCA mandates a president, secretary, and treasurer. 190
The same person cannot be both president and secretary . 191
The official explanation for deleting this statutory mandate
in the RMA is that "little purpose is served by a statutory re
quirement that there be certain officers, and statutory require
ments may sometimes create problems of implied or apparent
authority or confusion with non-statutory offices the corporation
114

See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.32 official comment ( 1984)
.
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.40(a), (d)(l984) .
111
The four are Delaware, Illinois, North Carolina, and New York. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 142 ( 1983); ILL. Rtv. STAT. ch. 32, § 8.50 (Smith-Hurd 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-34 0982); N.Y. Bus. CORP LAW § 7 1 5 (McKinney 1986).
See 2 MODEL Bus1NEss CORP. ACT ANN. 1040-41
(3d ed. 1985)(listing of states
.
requmng president, secretary, and treasurer) .
' " Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-95 (1972). The MBCA further requires "one or more vice
.
presidents u may be provided in the bylaws;" of course,
the bylaws may provide for no
auch officers. Id.
111

.

'.�

1•1
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desires to create." 192 Agency law questions aside, however, it is
probable that the notion of mandated officers is so deeply en
graine d with most corporate practitioners that its elimination
may engender more confusion than it saves. It is noteworthy
that at least two states that have recently revised their corporate
statutes with substantial reference to the RMA have rejected
this provision, each continuing to require at least a president
and secretary.193
Thus, it is recommended that Mississippi continue to re
quire that a corporation have at least a president and secretary.
On the other hand, logically the prohibition against one person
holding those offices simultaneously should be eliminatedm un
less the bylaws provide otherwise. It would seem anomalous to
permit a corporation to be governed by a board of directors com
posed of one person and, at the same time, require the fiction of
a separate president and secretary. Admittedly, certain business
transactions sometimes involve the performance of formal func
tions that would ordinarily require separate officers, such as
cross-certification of the other's signature. It is unlikely, how
ever, that this would pose a problem in the extremely closely
held corporation, and realistically it is only such a corporation
that would avail itself of this option. Should the interests of the
participants be better served by mandating that these offices be
separated, an appropriate provision could be inserted in the
bylaws.
The second distinction between the RMA and MBCA in
this area is a matter of perhaps greater substance: as is true for
directors, RMA Section 8.32 prescribes a standard of conduct for
officers vested with "discretionary authority. mea In most re-

,.. REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. ACT § 8.40 official comment ( 1984).
ua See 1986 Tenn. Pub. Acts 887, § 8.40(a) (effective Oct. 1, 1987); VA. CoDE ANN. §
13.l-872 (A)(repl. vol. 1985). To be fair, however, the new Illinois Business Corporation
Act follows the RMA in this regard, although it requires bylaw authority for an individ
ual to hold more than one office simultaneously. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 8.50 (Smith
Hurd 1985). Indiana likewise adopts the RMA but requires at least one officer. IND. STAT.
ANN. § 23-1-36-1 (Burns Supp. 1986).
1 84
This is the approach taken in Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-872(A), (D)(repl.
vol. 1985) .
... REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 8.42 (1984). Interestingly, there was an
additional element of parallelism in the Exposure Draft that was not carried over to the
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spects, this section is substantively identical to the provision for
directors,196 the sole difference being a more limited " safe harbor" right of reliance.197
.
Primarily for the reasons previously discussed relatmg to
the duty of care of directors,19s this provision of the RMA should
not be adopted. Although it is clear that officers, as fiduciaries,
owe duties of care and diligence to their corporations,199 few
states, even those codifying a standard for director conduct,
have attempted to define statutorily the scope of officers' du
ties.200 Moreover, at least three states adopting much of the
RMA deleted section 8.42. 201 Fundamentally, though, I believe
that such efforts are premature for Mississippi, and would rec
ommend that no similar statute be enacted here. 202

D.

Indemnification

Subchapter E of Chapter 8 of the RMA composes in its en
tirety a set of complex, and potentially controversial, provisions
involving the indemnification of corporate directors, officers,
agents, and employees. The current " crisis" (perceived or real)

RMA. In the Exposure Draft, the rules on conflicts of interest embraced officers
u

as

well

directon. As previously noted, the final draft of RMA Section 8.31 speaks only of

directors . a decision with which I personally agree. It is curious, however, that neither
the official comment to the RMA nor the commentary in the new Revised Model Busi
neu Corporation Act A nnotated addresses the rationale for this change.
, .. See supra text at note 1 17.

'" The statute does not grant an officer the right to rely upon data supplied by a
Acr §
committee of the board. Compare REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP.
he
which
�. 30(b)(3)( 1984)(d irector is entitled to rely on reports by committee of board of

not a member and which he reasonably believes merit confidence) with id . § 8.42( b)
(officer i11 entitled to rely on reports prepared by employees whom he reasonably believes
to be compete t or legal counsel as to matters within the person's expert competence) .
�
Presumably this reflect.a the greater degree of familiarity with corporate affairs that can

11

reuonab ly be demanded of officers . See id. § 8.42 official comment .
... ee
.
s
!Upra notes 99-140 and accompanymg
text.
,.. See Ht:NN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, §§ 231-234 (discussion of duties of
management).
,.. See 2 REv1sw MooBL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 1068
(3d ed . 1985).

"' These states are Illinois, Indiana, and Virginia. TenneBBee, however, adopted it
.
without
change. 1986 Tenn. Pub. Acts 887, § 8.42 .

... I would include in this recommendation the
right of reliance for officers, al
though cer-uinly this aspect of the statute is less objectionab
le than the overall effort to
define a ata nda rd of conduct.
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surrounding the imposition of liability on corporate fiduciaries
for breach of their managerial responsibilities, coupled with in
creasing restrictions on the availability and coverage of directors
and officers ("D & 0") insurance, has focused heretofore unpar
alleled attention on this area. 203 Clearly an entire article could
be devoted to this one topic, but such an exegesis is beyond the
scope of this work. In order to maintain this discussion within
manageable bounds, some comments concerning the approach to
be taken are in order.
First, the Mississippi law on indemnification204 and its rela
tionship to the 1969 Model Act have been extensively developed
previously in this Journal. 206 That discussion is important as
backgrou n d to much that is to follow, since I will undertake no
such detailed comparison here. Rather, other than a brief sum
mary of existing Mississippi law, this article will focus on the
RMA and its approach to the issue.
Second, this article will accept the premise that the obvious
trend nationwide is towards broad indemnification provisions, as

evidenced by the fact that at least thirty-five states have
adopted at least substantial equivalents to either the 1969
Model Act or the RMA, although the exact detail of such stat
utes varies fairly widely from state to state. 206 As will be seen,
the MBCA approach is considerably out of step with current
statutes; thus some modification of existing Mississippi law is in
order. On the other hand, I believe that in some respects modern
statutes may go too far,207 although my views on this are not as
101

An excellent comprehensive text is J. BISHOP, THE LAW or CORPORATE DIRECTORS

AND 0PPICERS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE ( 1982) [hereinafter cited as BISHOP, IN
DEMNIPICATION]. For general background on recent issues in this area, see Hinsey, The
New Lloyd's Policy Form for Directors and Officers Insurance-An Analysis, 33 Bus.
LAw. 1961 ( 1978); Johnson, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Di
rectors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993 ( 1978) (hereinafter cited as Johnson].
104
108

Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79-3-7(0)(1972).

See Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 393-98 (discussing Mississippi law on in
demnification and its relationship to 1969 Model Act).
ining
109 See 2 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT ANN. 1093-99 (3d ed. 1985)(conta
detailed analysis of existing statutes). Since that annotstion was prepared, Indiana, Ten
nessee, and
1
°' Fo r
rectors of a
expenses to

Virginia have substantially adopted the RMA provisions.
example, under a 1986 amendment to its corporation laws, the board of di
Delaware corporation can adopt a general authorization of advancement of
a director or officer, rather than requiring a case-by-case determination of
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extreme as some.208 Thus, the primary purpose of this discussion
will be to suggest those respects in which the RMA, the ap
.
proach of which is generally recommended, should be modified
to conform with sound policy. The goal, as it has been stated,
should in all instances be to strike the balance between encour
aging managers not to violate their duties, and discouraging
them from serving at all.209
In order fully to evaluate the desirability of the RMA ap

proach to indemnification and related issues, however, a brief
summary of current Mississippi law is necessary. The operative
provision is section

79-3-7(0) of the MBCA. Following the pat

tern of earlier versions of the Model Act, it only establishes the
corporate power to indemnify; indemnification is thus elective,
never mandatory.2 1 0 Indemnification extends only to directors
and officers and persons who served at the corporation's request
as a director or officer of a subsidiary corporation or

a

corpora

tion of which it is a creditor. It speaks only of "expenses actually
and reasonably incurred" in the defense of a civil or criminal
action, suit, or proceeding. Thus, the power to indemnify for

the entitlement to such, with the corresponding commitment by the recipient being lim·
ited to an agreement to reimburse the corporation only if he is affirmatively determined

not to be entitled to indemnification. DEL. CooE A NN. tit. 8, § 145( 3)(1986). Moreover,
the state now provides that the provisions of the Act on advancement of expenses, as
well

as

indemnification, are expressly non-exclusive. Id. § 145(0.

Indeed , in an unprecedented move, the Delaware Legislature has empowered corpo·

rations to adopt charter provisions or amendments that eliminate or limit the personal
liabilit� of directors for breaches of the duty of care, although liability cannot be limi ted
for a director who breaches his duty of loyalty, does not act in good faith, engages in
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law, receives an improper personal
benefit, or pays an illegal dividend or approves an illegal stock repurchase. Id. §

102(b)(7). According to a synopsis of the new legislation, the legislature is responding to
" ��cent chan �� in the market for directors' liability insurance" resulting in an unavaila·
bihty of trad1t1onal policies, or any type of policy from traditional insurance carriers. Cf.

Johnson .. supr note 203, et 2035-36 (suggesting that statutes fixing maximum liability
�
for certain cle1ms may be desirable in order to allow management and insurers to evalu
.
ate legal risks
they are assuming).

,.. See e g B.ishop, S 1ttmg
.
Ducks, supra note 14 (discussing criticism of trend to·
: :
ward perm1ss1ve or management-oriented statute
s).
'00 Johnson, supra note 203, at
1994.
.
uo
For d .1scuss1ons of the power of indemnification at common law, see J. B1sHOP,
IND!MNIFICATION. supra note 203, ,, 5.01-5.05
; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53 , § 379;
Cheell, Control of Corporate Indemnification: A Propo!1ed
Statute, 22 VAND. L. REV. 255,
258-6! ( 1969)(hereinafter cited as Cheek] .
·•

·
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judgments, settlements, or attorney's fees is unclear. Moreover,
no distinction exists between third party and derivative actions.
Indemnification is prohibited if the director or officer is ad
judged liable for negligence, misconduct, or violations of the
Mississippi antitrust or fair trade statutes; no other standard or
conduct is addressed. The statute is expressly non-exclusive, and
it permits "any other indemnification" authorized by the arti
cles, bylaws, or shareholder resolution. However, it imposes no
specific limitations on the ability of a corporation to make in
demnification that might contravene public policy.211 Finally,
the statute does not refer to either advancement or expenses of
insurance. 2 1 2
In contrast, Sections 8.50 through 8.58 of the RMA set forth
a detailed and integrated set of rules dealing with indemnifica
tion. The source of the provisions was an amendment to the
1969 Model Act adopted in 1980. The RMA reorganizes that
provision to add clarity without altering its substance.218 In gen
eral, it deals with indemnification of three types: permissive,
mandatory, and court ordered. It also incorporates an extensive
and extremely useful set of definitions which apply only to sub
chapter E. 214
Section 8.51 establishes
cretionary) indemnification.
who is or was a director and
ing2u may b e indemnified so

the criteria for permissive (or dis
Under that section an individual
who is made a party to a proceed
long as he acted in good faith and,

in addition, meets the following tests: (1) in the case of conduct
in his official capacity, he reasonably believed his conduct was in
111

Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-7(0)(1972); Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 393-97 (cor
poration may make indemnification in any situation authorized by articles of incorpora
tion, bylaws, or stockholders' resolution).
111

See Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 397-98.
See 2 REVISED MODEL Bus1NEss CORP. ACT ANN. 1088-91 (3d ed. 1985). Thus, an
extremely valuable source document for understanding the RMA rules on indemnifica
tion is Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Indemnification of
Corporate Personnel, 34 Bus. LAW. 1595 (1979) (report of the Committee on Corporate
Laws) [hereinafter cited as Changes Affecting Indemnification], which details the new
law and the respects wherein it differs from the 1969 Model Act.
•u

114

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Ar:r ANN. § 8.50 ( 1984) .
" Proceed ing" is defined as "any threatened, pending, or completed action, suit,
or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative, or investigative and whether for
mal or informal." Id. § 8.50(7).
1 11
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the corporation's best interest; (2) if not acting officially, he rea
sonably believed his conduct was at least not opposed to the cor
poration's best interest; and (3) if in a criminal proceeding, he
had in addition to the above no reasonable cause to believe his
conduct was unlawful. 2 1 8
Under this section indemnification is prohibited in two in
stances: (1) in a derivative action where the individual was ad
judged liable to the corporation; and (2) in any other proceed
ings where liability is imposed on the grounds that the
individual received an improper personal benefit. 2 1 7 Finally, in a
derivative action permissive indemnification is limited to ex
penses (which expressly includes attorneys' fees2 18) incurred in
connection with the action. 2 19
This much of the RMA appears to strike an appropriate
balance between the interests of the corporation and manage
ment. While it certainly will allow indemnification of directors
adjudged liable for certain breaches of duty so long as the appli
cable standard of conduct is met,220 sufficient procedural safe 
guards are established elsewhere by the RMA to make the likeli
hood of abuse remote. 22 1 Before discussing those safeguards ,
however, the more potentially controversial area of mandatory
indemnification must be considered.
Section 8.52 provides that a director who is "wholly success... Id. § 8.5l(e). A separate standard of conduct exists for ERISA claims. Id. §
8.Sl(b) & official comment 2.
111
Id. § 8.5l(d).
111
Id. § 8.50(3).
111
Id. § 8.5l(e). The commentary explains that this is intended to prevent the cor
poration from seeking to indemnify a director for a settlement which the director has
paid to the corporation. Judgments would of course be excluded by § 8.5l(d)(l). See id. §
8.Sl(e)
official comment 5 (limits indemnification in suits brought by or in right of
�orporat1on for exp�nses incurred in connection with proceedings in order to avoid circu
ity that would be involved if corporation sought to indemnify directors for payments
made in settlement by director to corporation).
e
no It should be noted that the standard defi
ned in § 8.5 1 is not a purely subj ectiv
on�; rather, both the subjective test of good faith and the objective test of reasonabl
_ could work
behef must be met. Arguably this
to the detriment of the "honest but d umb
director. At the same time, however, it serves 88 a check upon the ability to indemnify a
party who may be admittedly liable. For criticism of the objective standard see Cheek,
supra note 210, et 279-80.
111
Cf. Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 395-96 (discussing similar issues under 1 969
Model Act).

�

�
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otherwise" in a proceeding is entitled to
payment of his reasonable expenses. 222 The idea that the direc
tor must be "wholly successful" is a salutary one; it is intended
to preclude the possibility of partial indemnification of a direc
tor who successfully defends some but not all counts, a result
that had been reached under other statutes. 223 The objection to
the statute, however, should be obvious: the "or otherwise" lan
guage could make mandatory the indemnification of a director
who, for example, might be liable for breach of the duty of loy
alty yet have a valid procedural defense such as the statute of
limitations. 224
Admittedly, this provision appears in most indemnification
statutes. The justification given by the drafters of the RMA for
this seeming anomaly is that a defendant with a valid procedural
defense should not be put to the burden of a long and expensive
trial on the merits merely to establish his right to indemnifica
tion. 2 211 While this may doubtless have merit in some situations,

I believe that for public policy reasons mandatory indemnifica
tion should be limited to persons who are successful on the mer
its. 226 I submit that this imposes no undue burden on the direc
tor with a valid procedural defense, because the RMA would still
allow him to seek permissive indemnification, so long as the re
quirements of section 8.51 are met, 237 or to seek court-ordered
indemnification12 8 in other instances. 219
112

REvrsED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. ACT § 8.52 (1984)(emphasis added).
Id. official comment. The notorious case to the contrary was Merritt-Chapman &
Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. 1974), which held that a defendant who suc
cessfully obtained the dismissal of some but not all counts of an indictment was entitled
to partial indemnification. Id. at 141.
1
2 4 Hamilton, Reflections, supra note 8, at 1465 n.30.
m REvrsED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 8.52 official comment (1984); Hamilton,
Reflections, supra note 8, at 1465 n.30; see also BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION, supra note 203,
� 6.12, at 70 ( defendant who is otherwise successful by pleading statute of limitations
creates no right to indemnity, which may encourage unnecessary prolongation of costly
litigation) .
11'
This is the approach taken in California. See CAL. CoRP. CODE § 317(d) (West
1985)(mand atory indemnification is limited to persons who are successful on merits of
their suit) .
111

117

See supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
�n
Cf. Cheek, supra note 210, at 282-83 n.117 (limiting mandatory indemnificati
to perso ns successful on merits of suit does not impose harsh burden on those who win
m
11•
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The third method of indemnification under the RMA is that
by court order. Subject to limitation in the articles of incorpora
tion a director may apply to the court conducting a proceeding

a'n

or
other court of competent jurisdiction for an order of in
demnification.280 Indemnification can then be ordered in two in
stances: first, to enforce a right to mandatory indemnification; 23 1
or second, because the court determines that "the director is
fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification in view of all
the relevant circumstances," whether or not his conduct meets
the standard of section 8.51 or notwithstanding that he was ad
judicated liable in a derivative action or for receipt of an im
proper personal benefit. In this latter instance, however, indem
2
nification is limited to reasonable expenses incurred. 32
On balance, the RMA provision on court-ordered indemnifi
cation appears to be a desirable addition. Changes in control, for
instance, may motivate a corporation to refuse to make
mandatory indemnification or to decline a request for permissive
indemnification without valid reason. Some enforcement or re
view mechanism is, therefore, clearly indicated.
In order to obtain discretionary indemnification under sec-

on technicalities). It would seem unlikely that a corporation would, for example, refuse
to indemnify a director who clearly meets the standard of § 8.51; even if it should, how
ever, the director would still have recourse to a court to seek an order compelling indem
nification on that basis. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.54(2) (1984)(direc
tor is entitled to indemnification in view of all relevant circumstances whether or not he
met standards in § 8.51 or waa adjudged to be liable).
llO RE
VISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.54 (1984).

�

1 1
Id. § 8.54�1)(1984). In this instance the court is also required to award the direc
tor hl8 expenses Incurred in obtaining court-ordered indemnification. Id.
111
Id. § 8.54(2). Thus court-ordered indemnification would be the sole means
whereby a director could obtain indemnification with respect to derivative suits or im

proper benefit. Id. official comment.
O� course, one might question the appropriateness of granting any inde mnification
to a duector who has been adjudged liable to his corporation for breach of duty. The
drafters of the RM apparently felt, however, that an absolute prohibition o n su�h
tial
awards w� l� desira�le than delegating such discretion
to a presumably impar
.
court. While this prov1S1on may provide some comfort to management, it seems u nlikely
uzn·
that such awards would be made with any frequency. Only
in truly extraordinary circ
uct
d
stances (as, for example, where a court might establish a new
con
of
dard
legal stan
le
sib
much stricter than a director could have reasonably anticipated
) would it seem pos
t�at a court would �ke su�h ac�ion. Johnson, supra note 203, at l997. In any event, the
right to seek such mdemnification can be eliminated in the corporation's articles. RE
VISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.54 official comment (1984).

�
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tion 8.51 , a director must first establish that he has met the
standards established by that section.233 The determination of
eligibility is to be made by either (1) a majority of a quorum of
directors not parties to the proceeding, or, if such a quorum can
not be obtained, by majority vote of a committee appointed by
the entire board, which consists of two or more directors who are
not parties;234 (2) by special legal counsel;236 (3) or by the share
holders excluding the votes of directors who are parties to the
proceeding. 238 Assuming that it is determined that indemnifica
tion is permissible, the RMA then requires a separate authoriza
tion of indemnification, which is usually made by the same body
which determined that indemnification was permissible. 237
To be sure, this procedure can be criticized on various
grounds.288 On the whole, however, I believe that it provides a
181
IU
911

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.55(a) (1984).
Id. § 8.55(b)(l) & (2)(1984).
Id. § 8.55(3). By use of the term "special legal counsel," the RMA has reference

to attorneys with no prior profeBSional relationship to those seeking indemnification, who
are retained for the special occasion, and who are neither inside counsel or regular
outside counsel. Id. official comment. In so doing, the RMA wisely avoids the ambiguities
posed by some statutes (including earlier versions of the Model Act) which speak of
"independent legal counsel." See, BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION, supra note 203, ' 6.03(9], at
45-46 (requisite independence of "independent legal counsel" is uncertain); Johnson,
supra note 203, at 1998-99 (indemnification under Delaware law must be authorized

upon determination by board of directors or by "independent legal counsel" or by stock
holders). On the other hand, the RMA rejects the approach of at least one state, Ohio, in
defining the counsel eligible to serve. See Oum REV. CODE §

1701.13(E')(4) (Page

1985)(counsel cannot quality as "independent" if he or his firm has been retained by or
has performed services for corporation or person to be indemnified within previous five
years); Changes Affecting Indemnification, supra note 213, at 1612 (characterization of
legal counsel authorized to make required determination has been changed from "inde
pendent" to "special"; change is not intended to indicate that counsel chosen should not
be independent in accordance with governing ethical precepts).
tat

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.55(b)(4)(1984) .

.., Id. § 8.55(c). The exception is where special legal counsel determined the permis
sibility of indemnification, in which event authorization is made by the body empowered
to appoint counsel under § 8.55(b)(3). According to the comments, the factors to be con
sidered in this authorization include the reasonableness of expenses, the financial ability
of the corporation to pay, and the e:xtent to which resources should be allocated to this
or some other p urpose. Id. official comment.
other directors can truly
•aa For e:xample, one might question the extent to which
exercise disinterested judgment when dealing with a colleague. Moreover, it is doubtful
whether many attorneys would be willing to opine as to such matters, rendering this an
impracticable alternative. See Johnson, supra note 203, at 1999 (discussing problems in
herent in obtaining opinion of independent counsel); cf. Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at
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workable structure that adequately protects the interests of
shareholders, with two exceptions. First, I do not believe that
the decisions on eligibility or authorization should be delegated
to a committee . If a quorum of disinterested directors (i.e., di
rectors not parties to the proceeding) cannot be obtained, eligi
bility should be determined only by special counsel or the share
holders,238 with the final decision on authorization left to the
shareholders alone. The participation of interested directors
should be limited solely to the designation of special counsel in
instances where that alternative is adopted.240
Second, I would enact the requirement imposed by the 1979
amendments to the Model Act, as modified in part in the RMA,
that any indemnification of a director made in accordance with
the statute be reported in writing to the shareholders either
prior to or together with the notice of the next succeeding share
holders' meeting. 24 1 Such disclosure may provide a significant
procedural safeguard against abuse of the indemnification pro
2
cess and should be adopted by Mississippi .24
One of the most practically important aspects of indemnifi
cation under the RMA is the authorization of advancement of

of
395-96 (determinations made by independent legal counsel are questionable but la ck
reasonable alternatives makes solution acceptable) .
(d
111
This was the approach of the 1969 Model Act. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 5 )
( 1969) .

�

th
. s.o
This, of course, would necessitate rewording of § 8.55(b) and (c) to con form w
this result The drafters of the RMA take the position that the somewhat m ore e xtensive
:
role sanctioned by § 8.55 is "justified by a principle of necessity." REVISED MoDEL B USI
ilitates
NESS CoRP. Ar:r § 8.55 official comment (1984). While
it is surely true that it fac
seems
the p ocess, particularly in the publicly-held corporation,
A
�
in this respect the RM
to s
g the balance too far in the interests of manag
ement.
REVISED MoDEL Bus1NEss CoRP. Ar:r § 16.21(a)(1984); MonEL BUSINESS CoRP.
Acr § 50Hl980). By use of the words " in
nt con
accordance with " the 1979 amendme
templated not only any indemnification made
nt to a
under the s tute, but also pursua
charter, bylaw, or other provision in accordan
tee �n
ce with the statute. The Commit
d m
Corp rate Laws apparently believed that
re
�
reporting of mandatory or court-orde
.
note
a
demmficatlon was n t m dated by § 5(1).
pr
su
See Changes in Indemnification,
�
�
t re
no
2 1 , at 1615 (reporting of indemnification payments
ors
irect
or advances to nond
quired by § 5(1)) . The "in accordance with"
broad
language would, however, seem
.
enough to encompass this as well.
See Cheek, supra note 210, at 288 (such notice
ull pro.
is necessary to provide f
.
.
m odel
tection to corporate officers and thus has been
d
se
ad opted for me1us10n in propo
statute); Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 396 (same)
.

:!�

�

�

...

·
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expenses, a p rovision that, as previously noted, is absent in Mis
sissippi. Under section 8.53, advancement or payment of reason 
able expenses can be made i f ( 1 ) the director states in writing
his good faith belief that he meets the criteria of section 8.5 1; (2)
the director undertakes in wri ting to repay the advance if it is
ultimately determined that he did not meet the applicable stan
dard; and (3) a determination is made pursuant to the procedure
of section 8.55 that " the facts then known . . . d o not preclude
indemnification. "243
Given the potentially crushing burden of legal expenses
alone in protracted proceedings, this provision is clearly reasona
ble. Without it, eventual indemnification may as a practical mat
ter be meaningless to the director who has already suffered fi
nancial ruin as a result of legal fees. While one might argue that
the "undertaking" to repay should be secured in order to guar
antee repayment, this may work only to discriminate unfairly
against the less wealthy director who cannot afford security.244
Moreover, the same procedure for determining eligibility and
authorizing payment must be followed as for discretionary in
demnification, again providing an adequate safeguard against
abuse.
As previously noted, the MBCA only specifically extends
the power to indemnify to directors and officers, although the
"any other i ndemnification" language could be construed to al
low indemnification of agents and employees pursuant to provi
sions in the articles, bylaws, or by shareholder resolution. The
RMA separately provides for indemnification of officers, employ
ees, and agents, and treats them in a manner distinct from di
rectors in some instances. In substance, the operation of Section
8.56 of the RMA is as follows: officers, employees, and agents of
the corporation who are not directors may receive discretionary
indemnification on the same basis as directors under section

10

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.53(a), (c)(l984).
Johnson, supra note 203, at 1999. Moreover, as previously noted in this Journal,
"inability to pay" is a risk taken not only by the corporation which makes advances; the
corporation itself may be financially unable to provide discretionary indemnification
which is clearly justified, or mandatory indemnification pursuant to a court decree. See
Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 397 (corporation may be financially unable to indemnify
director even though he is entitled to indemnification as matter of right).
a..
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8.51. In light of their different capacities and the different duties

that may attach thereto, however, the RMA also allows a corpo
ration to provide broader indemnification rights than does the
statute, whether by the articles, bylaws, board action or con

tract, subject only to the overriding limitation of public policy.
Second, officers who are not directors (but not employees or
agents) have the same right to mandatory indemnification as di
rectors. In each of these cases, however, the articles can limit the
rights otherwise granted by statute. Finally, directors who also
serve in another capacity are in all events limited to indemnifi
cation under the other sections of subchapter E.2411

Clearly it is salutary to extend indemnification to employees

and agents. The major disadvantage of the RMA is the lack of
clarity in the "public policy" limitation to the expansion of in
demnification rights for non-director officers, employees and
agents. 149 While the interests of simplicity would be served by
making the indemnification provisions for such persons coexten
sive with those of directors, the RMA is probably correct in con
cluding that different considerations might apply to them that
would make the limitations imposed upon director indemnifica
tion inappropriate. Moreover, any board action in this regard is
subject to the obligations of the duty of care, and just as broader
rights can be extended by corporate action, even the statutory
rights can be eliminated by provision in the articles.
On a related point, even as to directors the RMA is nonex
clusive; that is, it recognizes that corporations may make provi
sions for indemnification of directors in their articles, bylaws, or
otherwise. This would permit, for example, a provision mandat

ing indemnification that would otherwise be permissive, or com
mitments to indemnify directors to the fullest extent perm itted
by law.147 The RMA, however, clarifies an ambiguity in earlier
versions of the Model Act and in some other states with nonex

clusive provisions by explicitly providing that such provisions

1'"

R&v1s10 Moon BUSINESS CoRP. Acr § 8.56 & official comment

(19 84 ) .

c
(sin ce limits of permissible inde m n ifi a·
t
tha
g
atin
tion are unclear under existing law, adoption of bylaw or charter provisions st
"
law
by
ed
permitt
and
directors
indemnify
ehall
corporation
officers " to the full extent

... Cf.

Johnson , !upra note

203,

at

2009- 1 1

may be bett alternative).
"' REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 8.58(a) official comment ( 1984 ).
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must be consistent with subchapter E .241 Thus under no circum
stances can indemnification for directors be broadened beyond
that permitted by the RMA. The RMA approach is desirable
and should be followed.
The final significant provision of subchapter E involves di
rectors and officers insurance,249 an issue not addressed by the
MBCA. 2110 Generally D & 0 coverage has two aspects: reimburse
ment to the corporation for amounts paid to individuals pursu
ant to indemnification laws, and direct liability coverage to di
rectors and officers for liabilities and expenses for which a
corporation cannot legally indemnify them, such as liability to
the corporation itself for negligence. This latter coverage would
also extend to instances where the corporation could make in
demnification but does not, either because it is insolvent or con
trol has changed. 211 1
A potentially controversial aspect of the RMA is that it, like
many modern statutes,2 112 permits the corporation to purchase
insurance for a director, officer, agent or employee, against lia-

1" Id. The q uestion frequently posed was whether a nonexclusive statute could be
effectively circumvented merely by provisions in the articles or bylaws, and the extent of
public policy restraints on such provisions. See, e.g., BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION, supra note
203, � 6.03 [ 1 ) [a] (discussing ambiguities arising from use of nonexclusive language and
extent to which courts will enforce); Cheek, supra note 210, at 276-78 (nonexclusive
clause minimizes effectiveness by injecting elements of uncertainty as to how far courts
will allow corporations to go); Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 396-97 (limitations on
indemnification are easy to circumvent); Johnson, supra note 203, at 1 996 (bylaws or
agreements could be drafted providing for more extensive protection than specified in
other provisio ns of nonexclusive statutes although public policy limits extent to which
bylaws or agreements may exceed statutory formulation).
10 Presumably the "other indemnification" language of Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-37( 0)(1972) could be construed to authorize the purchase of such insurance.
26°
For general background on D & 0 insurance policies see BISHOP, INDEMNIFICA
TION, supra note 203, n 8.01-8.07; Hinsey, supra note 108; Johnson, supra note 203, at
2012-36.
201

See BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION, supra note 203, 11 8.03 [1] (any cost which is law
fully inde mnifiable is also "insurable"); Johnson, supra note 203, at 2013-23, 2034-36
(discussing coverage of D & O policies and liabilities that cannot be covered by corporate
indemnification or D & O liability insurance). Of course, various exclusions exist, those
most notable being uninsurable risks and matters such as dishonesty, self-dealing, and
willful misconduct. Johnson, supra note 203, at 2035.
161 E. .
g , CAL. CoRP. CODE § 317(i) (West 1985) (corporation may purchase insurance
on behalf of agent of corporation against liability whether or not corporation would have
power to indemnify agent against such liability under provisions of this section).
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bilities arising from his status as such, whether or not the corpo
ration would have the power to indemnify him under sections

8.51 and 8.52. 263 Arguments have been made on policy grounds
that the corporation's power to purchase insurance should be
limited to liabilities for which statutory indemnification is per
m itted. 354 That objection, however, seems misplaced, because
the exclusions contained in D & 0 policies are consistent with
generally accepted notions of public policy. Moreover, the stat
ute does not make an uninsurable risk insurable. HG The effect,
then, is to render the purchase of insurance by the corporation a
form of compensation, which should be a matter within the
board's discretion. 2118 Thus, I would recommend the adoption of
section 8.57 in its present form.

E.
1.

Shareholders267

Voting of Shares.

The most obvious and potentially significant departure of
the RMA from the MBCA provisions on voting is the elimina
tion of compulsory cumulative voting. A majority of state s now
make cumulative voting elective. 268 Mississippi is one of a hand
11•
ful that has a constitutional mandate for cumulative voting .2

Il l

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.57 (1 984) .
... See, e.g., Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 397 (current Model Act authorizes
corporations to purchase insurance covering liability of director even if corporation
would not have power to indemnify him against such liability).
1" Johnson, supra note 203, at 1999-2000, 2016-21, 2034-36.
... But cf. Cheek, supra note 210, at 273-74 (although insurance should be consid
ered compensation, director indemnification should not be considered justified as part of
executive's compensation protecting him against future liability which has not arisen
since payment is predicated on determinations of liability or on settlements, in which
case corporations must reimburse executive).
117
This section will discuss shareholders only in the context of their general role in
the statutory scheme of management and control. Other issues relating to capitalization
(e.g., preemptive rights), shareholder litigation, and shareholders in the context of the
closely-held corporation will be dealt with in Part 2 of this article .
... 1 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 676 (3d ed. 1985). The 1950 Model
Act, upon which the MBCA was based, made cumulative voting mandatory. Beginning in
1960, however, the option of permissive cumulative voting was recognized, and the 1969
Model Act eliminated mandatory cumulative voting altogether as an option in section 33.
Id. at 673.
uri,
m Miss. CoNST. art. VII, § 194. The others are Arizona, Idaho, Kentucky, Misso
South Dakota, and West Virginia. See ARIZ. CONST. art. XIV, § 10; IDAHO CoNST. art. XI,
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Section 7.28(b) of the RMA denies the right of cumulative vot
ing unless the
incorporation. 260

corporation

"opts

in"

by

its

articles

of

Whether accomplished by an "opt in" or "opt out" provi
sion, mandatory cumulative voting should be eliminated in Mis
sissippi. Given its traditional justification, i. e., the facilitation of
minority representation on the board of directors, the broad rea
sons for this recommendation are twofold: in the public corpora
tion, it serves little purpose at all, and in the closely-held corpo
ration, it does not provide an efficient, or even effective, means
to its avowed end.
Specifically, in the public corporation it is unlikely that any
group of shareholders will pool sufficient votes, and then cumu
late their votes with the requisite common guiding intelligence,
to alter the outcome of an election where management has solic
ited proxies.

Thus, in most instances mandatory cumulative

voting serves only to unnecessarily complicate
process.261

the election

In the closely-held business, there are other devices that are
simply more effective in ensuring minority representation on the
board such as shareholders' agreements providing for the elec
tion of certain persons, classification of shares with different
classes e ntitled to elect a specified number of directors, or
supermajority vote provisions which could give the minority an

§ 4; Kv. CoNST. § 207; Mo. CONST. art. XI, § 6; S.D. CoNST. art. XVII, § 5; W. VA. CoNsT.
art. XI, § 4.
An extensive body of literature exists debating the merits of cumulative voting. For
general reference see Axley, The Case Against Cumulative Voting, 1950 Wrs. L. REV.
278; Bhagat & Brickley, Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting
Rights, 27

J. LAW & EcoN. 339 ( 1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law,

26 J. LAW OP EcoN. 395 (1983); Sobieski, In Support of Cumulative Voting, 15 Bus LAW.
.

316 (1960); Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anachronism, 16 Bus. LAW. 550
(1961); Young, The Case for Cumulative Voting, 1950 Wrs. L. REV. 49.

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 7.28(b)(1984).
"1 This s ituation assumes, of course, the ordinary election in which there has been
no

no countervailing solicitation by an insurgent group seeking to oust incumbent directors.

It is only fair to say that these are contrary views of cumulative voting in public corpora
tions. See, e.g., Bhagat & Brickley, supra note 259, at 340-41 (discussing proponents'
arguments in favor of cumulative voting); Sobieski, supra note 259, (importance of cu
mulative voting to minority shareholders); Young, supra note 259, at 49-56 (arguing in
favor of statute granting shareholders the right to cumulative voting).
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effective veto of any election that did not include minority rep
resentation. 282 The "protection" of cumulative voting is more
apparent than real, since its impact can easily be undercut by
staggering the board of directors or simply reducing the size of
the board. 283 Indeed, mandatory cumulative voting may be di
rectly disadvantageous to minority stockholders, in that it may
obscure the need for more explicit and careful planning of the
parties' relationship. 284
To be sure, the issues involved in eliminating mandatory cu
mulative voting are not entirely clear cut, and substantial debate
continues on the question. Still, Mississippi is in a shrinking mi
nority in rendering it nonelective. Of course, cumulative voting
should be available as a planning device to those who desire it.
It should not, however, be forced arbitrarily upon those corpora
tions for which it is clearly inappropriate. Thus, I would recom
mend the amendment of the Mississippi Constitution to elimi
nate compulsory cumulative voting and the enactment of
elective provision similar to the RMA.

an

On the other hand, if the election of cumulative voting is
made, the RMA engrafts procedural impediments upon the exer
cise of that right which should not be adopted. Specifically, even
if cumulative voting rights exist, under the RMA shares cannot
be voted cumulatively unless the notice of the meeting or proxy
statement states conspicuously that cumulative voting is author
ized, or a shareholder gives not less than 48 hours notice of his

111 8ee, e.
t' g
"·
�. , . HENN & ru.EXANDER,
supra note 53, § 265, at 719 (discussing vo 111
.
alternatives withm closely-held corporations)' Comment The Cons titutionality of the

Business Corporation Act's Voti�g Provisio , 1985 u. ILL. L. REV. 647, 6 3
(d1scussmg effects of cumulative voting) . Certain of these devices will be discussed in
Part 2 of this article .
sea
�ee HE.NN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 189, at 496 (outlining w ays to weaken
cumulat�ve vot�ng); Hamilton, Reflections, supra note 8 at 1468_69 (discussing effects
plished
cumulative votmg). In Mississippi, reduction of the oo
d's size could be accom
by amendment of the by-laws by the board, absent contrary provision in the articles.
Miss. CODE AN�. §§ 79-3-51, 69 (1972). Classifying or staggering the board must, how·
:
cult to
eve�, be authorized by the articles, so that admittedly
it is procedurally more diffi
achieve.
§ 79-3-71.
.
illi g
194 Cf Hamilton, Refl�ctions, supra note 8,
at 1468-69 (corporations may be w n
.
that
n
to structure transactions m manner which circum
ssio
pre
im
vents statute giving
.
statute provides greater protection than actually
exists).

1�3 Ill�nois

:i,

�

of
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65
intent to cumulate. 2 If the corporation elects cumulative vot
ing, there seems to be no justification for permitting such obvi
ous methods of circumventing that right. No sanction is imposed
by the RMA on management for failing to give such notice (al
though it is required by the SEC proxy rules) ,286 and it is un

likely that the average shareholder would have sufficient sophis
tication and knowledge of the law to expect him to comply. Only
a few states have adopted similar notice requirements287 and the
drafters' assertion that it is intended to ensure that all voting
shareholders understand the rules is not compelling. 288 This pro
vision, then, should be eliminated in Mississippi.
A final aspect of section

7.28 that

deserves comment is the

provision for the election of directors by a plurality of votes.169
Prior versions of the Model Act were simply silent on the ques
tion of the vote required to elect a director,270 although there
seems to be a common assumption that it is by a plurality.27 1
The MBCA likewise makes no such reference. 272 As a practical
matter, of course, this rule is necessary in any corporation where
shares are factionalized to the extent that no group can muster a
majority of votes. Since the RMA provides a corporation the op-

111
29•

REVISED MoDEL BusrNEss CORP. Acr § 7.28(d)(1984).
1 7 C.F.R. § 240.14a- 101(5) (c) (1986). Likewise, it would be only fair to note that

the SEC has generally encouraged cumulative voting whenever it has been in a position
to do so. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 189, at 497-98 n.24.
m

1 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 676 (3d ed. 1985).

188

See REVISED MooEL BusINESS CoRP. ACT § 7.28 official comment (2)(1984).

.., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 7.28(a)(1984). It should be noted that the
RMA adopts the general rule of one vote per share subject to contrary provisions in the
articles. The Exposure Draft took the position that different voting rights could be ex
tended to shares of the same class. REVISED MODEL BusrNESs CORP. Acr § 7.21 official
comment ( l ) (Exposure Draft March, 1983). The RMA deleted this statement, thereby
casting doubt on the question. In any event, under the MBCA nonvoting common stock
is not permitted and all common stock, regardless of class, has the right to one vote per
share. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-27, -63 ( 1972). The RMA provides desirable flexibility for
control arrangements in the closely-held corporation and is preferable. This iSBue will
more fully developed in Part 2.

be

"° See, e.g., MODEL BusrNEss CoRP. Acr § 35 (1969)(no mention of voting require
ments for election of director).
971

See, e.g. , HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 189, at 494 (discussing voting

techniques used to elect directors).
"1

See Miss. Com! ANN. § 79-3-69 ( 1 972)(no mention of voting requirements for

election of director).
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tion of selecting a different regime, this is an appropriate clarifi
cation of existing law.
The RMA would effect a needed change in Mississippi law
by providing some guidance on the circumstances under whic a

�

proxy may be irrevocable. The MBCA makes no reference to ir
r evocable proxies,273 thus leaving the question to be resolved by
application of the common law doctrine of proxies coupled with
interest. Section 7 .22 of the RMA provides that a proxy will
be irrevocable if it so states in a conspicuous manner a n d if the
appointment is coupled with an interest; it then enumerates
non-exclusive examples of such appointments.27"' In addition, a
safe harbor provision permits the corporation to accept a proxy's

an

authority notwithstanding the death or incapacity of the grant
ing shareholder unless notice is received before the proxyholder
votes.275
The RMA also contains various provisions of an essentially
procedural nature that would be desirable additions to the
MBCA. For example, section 7.04 elaborates on the process of
effecting shareholder action by unanimous consent, clarifying (as
is true for directors) that such action can be taken by signing
separate documents describing the action taken . Moreover, no
tice of such action must be given to holders of any nonvoting
6
shares who would have been entitled to notice of a meeting .27
Unlike the corresponding provision for directors,277 however , sec
tion 7.04 is curiously ambiguous on the question of the effectiv e
time of such consent and the right of a shareholder to withdraw

::: See id. § 79-3-63 (statute dealing with voting of shares).
�EVISED MODEL Bus1NESs CoRP. ACT § 7. 22(d)(1984). Proxies coupled

.
mterest

with an

include th�se held by a pledgee, a purchaser of the stockholder's shares, a credi 

tor �f the corporation who required the appointment as a condition to the extension of
rt
credit, an emplo ee 0 the corporation whose contract required
appointment, or a pa y
�
o a s are olders voting agreement. Any such appointment
terest
in
the
k
v
when
ed
is
o
re
�
1s extinguished. Id. § 7.22(0.
m Id. § 7·22(e). The rule at common
law, of course, is that death or disability of the
shareholder revokes a proxy automatically · HENN
& ALEXANDER, supra note 53 § 196
The RMA !so protects a bona fide purchaser
of shares as to which an irrevocab le pro xy
�
· r
·
has been given. If the certificate ( or miormation
statement for shares without cert•"fi .
cates) does not conspicuously n0te th e appomtm
ent, such a purchaser has the righ t to
re vo ke the appomtment. REv1sEo
MODEL BUSINESS CORP · ACT § 7 ·
22(g)

�

? ?

·

,

·

·

·

m
111

Id. § 7.04(a),(d).

see supr
a notes 90-91 and accompa .
nymg text.

·
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his consent. The comments assert thafconsent action is effective
only when the last consent is received by the secretary of the
corporation and that any shareholder is free to withdraw his
consent before that time; 278 explicit language to that effect in the
statute itself seems a preferable alternative.
Recognizing that the shares of many publicly held compa
nies are registered in the name of a nominee, the RMA permits
(but does not require)

corporations to establish procedures

whereby the beneficial owners of such shares can be "recog
nized" by the corporation a s the shareholders.2 79 Although the
extent of this recognition is to be as defined in the procedure,
the comments clearly contemplate the right not only to receive
communications but also to vote the shares so registered, thus
bypassing the nominee. 280
A feature of the RMA that is of particular benefit to the
publicly held company i s the fairly detailed set of rules in sec
tion 7.24 dealing with a corporation's acceptance of votes, con
sents, waivers, or proxy appointments. 281 Recurring and fre
quently vexing problems arise in attempting to reconcile and
decipher ambiguous signatures or those that do not correspond
to the corporation's records, and section 7.24 provides needed
measures of guidance and protection. In particular, the corpora
tion is authorized to reject any vote or related document if the
responsible officer has a good faith, reasonable belief about the
validity of the signature or about the signatory's authority to
sign for the corporation, and both the corporation and responsi
ble officer are absolved from liability for a rejection which meets
this standard. 282
An important change in the RMA appears in the general
provisions concerning voting. Under the MBCA, shareholder ac
tion is deemed effective if there is a quorum at the meeting and
there is an affirmative vote of a majority of the shares repre-

1 8
7 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
178 Id.

CoRP. ACT § 7.22 official comment 2 (1984).

§ 7.23(a).

180 Id.
official comment.

181

Id. § 7.24. The comments to this section are particularly useful in illustrating the
possible applications of the rules to various situations.
181
Id. § 7.24(c).
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sented at the meeting.111 The effect of this is to treat an absten
tion as a negative vote. In some insta nces this may lead to
anomalous results. Shareholders who may be indi fferent to the
resolution of a specific matter may effectively defeat it simply by
manifesting that indifference. The RMA adopts a rule that is
probably more consistent with a layperson 's expectation, that
being that action is effective if the votes cast in favor of an ac
tion exceed those cast against it, subject to contrary p rovisions
of the articles or the statute ..• This may, of course, lead to ap
.

proval by less than a majority of a quorum, but the basis for the
RMA rule is at least as rational as the traditional response to
abstentions and should be adopted.
On an issue, the RMA contains a blanket authorization for
supermajority quorum or voting requirements for any share
holder action; such provisions must of course appear in the arti
cles. A procedural safeguard also prevents alteration of any such
provision except by compliance with the standard that is the
subject of the proposed amendment. •ea
In one respect, the RMA would create an ambiguity that
does not exist under the MBCA. Section 6 1 of the MBCA allows
the articles of incorporation to set a less-than-majority quorum
requirement for shareholders, but not less than one-third.19• Ap 
parently in the belief that the one-third limitation was und uly

restrictive, the RMA eliminated that provision.287 Secti on 7 . 27 ,
however, authorizes only a greater than majority quoru m . By
i mplication, this would prohibit a less than majorit y q uorum,
absent some modification of the statutory language. Thus, sec
tion 7 . 27 should be amended to permit the articles to fix a quo
rum requirement of no fewer
than one-third
of the
shareholders.188

11•

Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-61 (1972).

1"

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.25(c ) ( l 984).

Id. § 7.27. Thus a provision requiring the affirmative vote of 80"� of all shares to
take action could not be amended except by the same vote.
111

111

Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-61 (1972).

117

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 7.25 official comment 5 ( 1 984 ).
4This is also the rule as to directors. See id. § 8.24(a), (b); see also supra note 9

111

95 and accompanying text.
ers
The RMA treats differently the issue of the withdrawal of directors or sharehold
re·
p
be
s
once a quorum is constituted. Under section 8.24(c) , 8 quorum must at all time
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Older versions of the Model Act and the MBCA recognized
the right of certain classes of shares to vote separately on some
issues. 289 The RMA introduces the general notion of voting by
voting group. A voting group is defined as "all shares of one or
more classes or series that under the articles of incorporation or
this Act are entitled to vote and be counted together collectively
on a matter at a meeting of shareholders. "290 Thus, preferred
shares with class voting rights in the MBCA would be consid
ered a voting group under the RMA, as would common shares
with special voting rights, which are currently not permitted by
the MBCA. 281
The effect of sections

7.25

and 7.26 of the RMA is to impose

on each voting group separately the quorum and voting rules of
the Act. Thus, if separate approval of a voting group is required
for a transaction, the quorum and voting standards must be met
for each voting group.
On the other hand, section 1.40 provides that " [a]ll shares
entitled by the articles of incorporation or this Act to vote gen
erally on [a] matter are for that purpose a single voting
group. "292 Thus, if a class of shares is to be treated as a voting
group, appropriate provisions to that effect m ust be made in the
articles. Draftsmen thus should be aware that separate voting

sent in order for a valid board vote to take place. Thus, directors may prevent action
from being taken by simply withdrawing from the meeting. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. AcT § 8.24(c)(l984). This is not possible under section 7.25(b); once a share is
represented at a meeting of shareholders for any purpose (including objection to the
transaction of business), it is deemed to be present thereafter at all times for purposes of
determining a quorum. Id. § 7.25(b). This rule also applies to any adjournment for which
a new record date is not set. Thus shareholders cannot withdraw and "break the quo
rum," an issue upon which courts have reached different conclusions. REVISED MODEL

BUSINESS CoRP. ACT §§ 7.25(c) & official comment 3, 8.24(c)(l984); see also 1 REVISED
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 653 (3d ed. 1985); Murphy, supra note 125, at 91. The

wording of the MBCA suggests that a quorum must be present at all times in order for
shareholders to act. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-61 (1972)(if quorum is present, affirma
tive vote of majority of represented shares is act of all shareholders in absence of other
statutory requirements) .
1
9•

See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § § 79-3-119, -145, -157, - 167, ( 1972)(dealing with

rights of holders of outstanding shares, rights of stockholders to dissent, and voluntary
dissolution by shareholders).
190

ui

HI

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 1.40(26) (1984).

See supra note 262.
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. § 1.40(26)(1984).
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es u nless provi
rights must be specifically confe rred by the articl
sion therefor is otherwise made by the RMA itself.
2. Inspection Rights.
to in
At comm on law, shareh olders were granted the right
times
spect the books and records of the corporation at proper
that
and places and for a proper purpos e. In practice , howev er,
ing
right was often an empty one, since the burden o f establish
im
the propriety of his purpose was, at least in earlier cases,
posed upon the shareholder.29s As a practical matter the right
could be enforced only by a mandamu s action, the delay and
a
expense of which in many cases simply foreclosed the issue . As
result, Mississippi , like most states, passed remedial legislation
to make the right of inspection a more realistic o n e . 294 Under
traditional statutes such as the MBCA, however , a number of
problems remain.
The MBCA grants the statutory right of inspection only to
shareholders who either have held their shares for at least six
months or who own at least one percent of all outstanding
shares. This does not prohibit those who cannot meet the requi
site standard from obtaining inspection since the common law
right is specifically preserved. The advantage of the statutory
right, of course, is that while the shareholder must state his pur
pose in writing, the burden of proving that it is improper is on
the corporation. The relevance of the size or length of time of a
shareholder's ownership to the propriety of his purpose is, how
ever, far from clear. Thus it is doubtful whether this limitation
serves any rational policy.2H
Moreover, the sanction for wrongful refusal to allow inspec
tion is a penalty of ten percent of the value of the shares owned
by the sharehold�r, assessed against the corporation o r its offic�r
or agent responsible for the refusal. In practice, however, the in
terrorem effect of this has been questionable. The value of the
shareholder's stock may be minimal and thus the penalty may

'" See 5
supra note 53, § 2214; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, §
199, at 537 (dtscussmg common law right of
shareholders to inspect records).
'" See Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-99 (1972)(a
ths
ny shareholder holding for six mon
precedmg demand or holding at least 1 3 of
ine
8lll
x
all outstanding shares has right to e
books and records for proper purpose) .
... See 4 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT ANN. 1725 (3d ed. 1985).

Y"· FL�CHER,

.
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be negligible. Moreover, even if the penalty would be substan
tial, courts have shown but little inclination to assess it.2116 In
deed, the enforceability of similar statutes has sometimes been
questioned on the basis that the penalty had no relation to ac
tual damages. 297
In other respects, the MBCA is simply undesirably vague.
For example, while the shareholder is accorded the right to ex
amine certain books and records "and to make extracts there
from, "298 the meaning of this is ambiguous-does it, for exam
ple, give the shareholder (or his agent and attorney) only the
right t o copy by hand, or must the opportunity to photocopy be
provided? Obviously the right to inspect could be substantially
frustrated if the statute is read literally, as representatives of a
corporation may be inclined to do.
Chapter

16 of

the RMA, dealing with records and reports,

makes substantial improvements to the traditional approach of
the MBCA. Section

16.01

mandates that a corporation maintain

generally the same records as does the MBCA: actions of the
directors and shareholders, accounting records, and a record of
shareholders. 299 Additionally, it requires that the corporation
keep at its principal office a number of essentially public records
(e.g. , its articles, bylaws and annual report) a s to which share

holders are given an absolute right to inspect. soo

The heart of the RMA inspection provisions is section

16.02,

m

For a collection of the few reported

m

See, e .g., Schaefer v. H.B. Green Transp. Line, Inc., 232 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1956),

cases

on the issue see id. at 1765-67.

holding such a statute unenforceable. Id. at 417. The basis for the decision was that the
plaintiff, an Illinois resident of an Iowa corporation doing business in both states, could
not extend extraterritorially the penalty provision of Illinois law where Iowa law made
no such provision. Id.
H8 Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-99 (1972).
H•

REVISED MoDEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 16.0l(a)-(c)(1984). In some instances, the

RMA description is somewhat more exact. In addition to "minutes of the proceedings of
shareholders and directors"

as

required by the MBCA, the RMA includes all actions

taken by consent or without a meeting (as by conference telephone call) and all actions
taken by committees. Id. § 16.0l(a). In addition, the RMA specifies that the sharehold

ers' list must be in alphabetical order, a logical requirement omitted by the MBCA. Id. §

16.0l(b). Finally, one difference in nomenclature exists: the RMA requires "appropriate

accounting records," while the MBCA dictates "correct and complete books and records
of account." Id.
•oo REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 16.0l(e), 16.02(a) ( l 984).
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which seeks to strike a balance between the interests of share
holders and corporations. Section 16.02 eliminates any distinc
tion based on time or size of stockholdings, and the statutory
right is extended to all shareholders. On the other hand, in order
to inspect records of the actions o f directors and shareholders,
acounting records, and the record of shareholders, a shareholder
must meet a somewhat more detailed standard . He must make
his demand in good faith and for a proper purpose, must de
scribe with reasonable particularity his purpose and the desired
records, and those records must be directly connected to his
stated purposes. 301 The avowed goal is to force the shareholder
to make a more "meaningful" statement of the reasons he seeks
inspection . 302
In addition to this specific right of inspection, section 16.02
also recognizes the shareholders' separate rights to insp ect the
03
record of shareholders in connection with the annual meeting,3
and to obtain information pursuant to discovery in litigation

with the corporation. 304 As with the MBCA, the com m on law
right of inspection is specifically preserved.30�
The RMA also prohibits a corporation from limiting the
statutory right of inspection by its articles or bylaws.306 While
the public policy implicit in the MBCA provision would seem to
prev �n� this, some state statutes have permitted "reasonable"
restrictions and an explicit denial of this power is desirable.
he R�A a so substantially alters the procedure for en forc
.
ing inspection rights. The financial penalty for unjustified re
fusal to permit inspection is eliminated. Instead, section 16. 04

�

!

"01

§

16.�2(b), (c). The MBCA requires only that the shareholder make a "writ
ten demand stating the purpose thereof...
The RM� does not purport to define "proper
purpose '" although the official com
ment to section 16.02 states that 1·t means
�
a purpose reasonably releva nt to the d .
.
§
in
mandmg shareholder, s mterest
as a sharehol der." Id .
16.02 official com ment. This,
.
� begs the questio
� of what "interest" means. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pillsbury v.
�el�, Inc., 291 Mmn. 322, 191 N.W.2d 406, 4 1 1 (197l) ("interest" contemplates con.
cern with mvestment return) For a coll
ection of cases on this issue see 3 REVISED MooEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT. ANN 1737-46 (3d ed. 1985).
IOI
REVISED M
B � ESs CoaP. AcT § 16.02 offic ial comment 3 ( 1984) .
i . §§
1 1
0
See d
16
§
- Id.
16.02(e)
(l).
§
•0•
Id.
§ 16.02(e)(2).
,.,. Id.
16.02(d).
Id.

"

�::

·

��� ���
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authorizes a shareholder to institute a judicial proceeding to
compel inspection of the records covered by either 16.02(a) or
(b). 307 If inspection is ordered and the corporation cannot carry
its burden of proving that it refused inspection due to a good
faith, reasonable doubt that the shareholder had the right to in
spect the requested records, the shareholder is entitled to pay
ment of his costs including reasonable attorney's fees. 308 In order
to prevent abuses by a shareholder, however, the court ordering
inpection can place reasonable restrictions on use or dissemina
tion of the information he obtains.309
The RMA also clarifies the scope of the inpection right, pro
viding that the right to "inspect and copy" under section 16.02
includes, where reasonable, the right to receive photographic or
similar copies, for which the corporation can assess a reasonable
charge

not exceeding

reproduction.3 1 0

the

estimated

cost of production or

The RMA provisions on inspection, then, eliminate certain
restrictions imposed without rational basis by the MBCA as well
as many of the ambiguities of our present law. Thus, I would
recommend the adoption of sections 16.01 through 16.04 of the
RMA without change.

3.

Dissemination of Financial Information.

Historically state corporation statutes have done little af
firmatively to mandate the disclosure of any i nformation to
shareholders. This has been true even though those same stat
utes sanction the device of proxy voting, by which a shareholder
can empower another person (often a member of management)
to vote

his shares for him. The result has

been a system

whereby, absent the elaborate disclosure rules applicable to
companies registered under the Securities Exchange Act of

807

Id. § 16.04(a)(b).
Id. § 16.04(c). In contrast, the MBCA lists a number of specific acts of share 
holder misconduct which provide a defense to a shareholder's claim to a penalty. See
Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-3-99 ( 1972)(corporation has defense if shareholder improperly used
•0•

information from prior examination, did not act in good faith, or has offered share
holder's list for sale).
808
no

REVlSED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 16.04(d)(1984).

Id. § 1 6.03(b), (c).
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1934,311 management can solicit proxies for its re-election with
out providing a shareholder with any information whatsoever
concerning the condition of his company.312
Like most states, Mississippi only requires a corporation to
provide a shareholder with financial information upon his �rit
ten request. 3 1 3 The RMA adopts a considerably more detailed
and burdensome requirement. Under section 16.20, every corpo
ration is required annually to furnish each shareholder its an
nual financial statements, including a balance sheet as of the
end of the fiscal year, an income statement for that year, and a
statement of changes in shareholders' equity for that ye ar .3 1•
The corporation must mail the statements within 120 days of
the end of the year to existing shareholders and thereafter dur
ing the ensuing year to any new shareholder who makes a writ
ten request.3 1 6 Under the RMA, this obligation is mandatory and
cannot be altered by the articles or bylaws.
While the intent of the RMA is laudable, I believe that it
places an unnecessary burden on many closely-held corpora
tions, the shareholders of which may be generally familiar with
the corporation's condition due to their active participation in
its affairs. On the other hand, I do not believe that simply leav
ing mandatory disclosure to the arena of the federal securities
laws is the appropriate answer since many corporations which
should legitimately be considered as publicly-held would not

"' Under § 12(g) ( l ) of the Act, every issuer with total assets exceeding $1,000,000
and a class of equity security held of record by 500 or more persons must register that
security. 15 U S C § 78l(g)(l982). By rule the asset threshold was increased to $3,000,000
in 1982, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 2 g-1 ( 1986), and to $5,000,000 in 1986. 51 Fed. Re g 25,360
.

.

.

.

( 1986).

'" See, e.g. , Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-63 ( 1972) (no mention of necessity of disclosure
�h� n soliciting proxies) ; FREY. CHOPPER, LEACH & MORRIS, supra note 53, at 428-29 (out·
hmng pr xy solicitation procedure). Indeed the inadequacy of state law in this area was a
�
primary impetus to the promulgation of the proxy regulation of
the SEC.
s
"' Under Section 99 of the MBCA, a shareholder is entitled
to receive the corpora·
i n's "most recent financial statements showing in reasonable
detail its assets and liabil·
?
•ties a d the re ults of its operations." Miss. CoDE
ANN. § 79.3.99 (1972). The over·
�
�
.
whelming ma1onty
of ststes follow this pattern. 4 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. Ac:r

�

A NN . 1773-74 (3d ed. 1985).
"' REVISED MonEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 16.20(a)(l984). The
statements are not
abeolutely required to be prepared on the basis of
generally accepted accounting princi·
pies I G AAP ) , but must be if those prepared
for the corporation itself are. Id.
111
Id. § 16.20(c).
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meet the filing requirements of the 1934 Act.316 Thus, I would
recommend the adoption of section 16.20, with a de minimis ex
ception allowing corporations with fewer than a specified num
ber of shareholders (perhaps fifty) to waive the mandatory re
quirement in their bylaws , while retaining the requirement that
the same information be provided to any shareholder upon writ
ten request.317 This would eliminate what might be an unneces
sary formality in the truly closely-held business, while encourag
ing frank disclosure from the management of the larger company
to its shareholders. 31 8

Ill

C ONCLUSION-PART ONE

The first part of this article has attempted to expose a vari
ety of areas of the MBCA which are in need of improvement or
modification. The second part will undertake a similar goal in
the areas of capitalization, organic changes, shareholder litiga
tion, and the problems of the closely-held business.

m
111

See supra note 311.

Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501(a)(West Supp. 1986)(permitting corporations with
fewer than 100 shareholders to waive mandatory requirement).
au To be sure, one objection to mandatory disclosure is that management may bear

liability for inaccurate information, even to a shareholder who may have no interest in
that information in the first instance. See Murphy, supra note 125, at 135 (discussing

alternatives for complete mandatory disclosure). While the possibility of second-guessing
is inherent in any disclosure requirement, the RMA, unlike the federal proxy rules, has
no express provision dealing with false and misleading statements. In any event, a de

minimis exception is likely to allay many of these concerns, since most larger companies

would be likely to employ an outside accountant, and no certification by management
would be required in that instance. See REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. Acr § 16.20(b)
(1984). In the smaller corporation, it seems unlikely that a court would impose substan

tial liability for good faith errors by a corporate official who is not a trained professional
accountant. See id. official comment (noting different standards which should be applied

to professionals and non-professionals under this provision).

